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A year after a democratic presidential election, Egyptian protestors returned to Tahrir 
Square to demand the resignation of President Mohammed Morsi because he refused to 
agree to an early election. Shortly after, President Morsi was toppled through a popularly-
supported military coup, and his Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organization was thoroughly 
repressed. Today, the democratic process ushered in by the 25 January Revolution in 
2011 has come to an end. Egypt seems to have returned to the previous authoritarian 
order that existed for over 60 years. Why did democracy fail to take hold in Egypt under 
the MB regime and President Mohammed Morsi? This thesis explores four hypotheses: 
Egypt’s non-readiness for democracy because of lack of socio-economic conditions; the 
failure of Egypt’s political actors to form a pact; the hostility of the Gulf States toward 
democracy and limited support from the international community; and the dissatisfaction 
of the deep state and economic elite with the MB in power. While all of these issues 
contributed to democracy failure in Egypt, the most critical component was that of the 
contribution of the political actors. If the political actors had formed a pact with the 
understanding that democracy would benefit all parties, they could have overcome the 
former regime and succeeded at aligning international support. 
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 MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION A.
When a third pro-democratic wave swept southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, 
Eastern Europe, and Africa but did not affect the Middle East, political scientists 
attributed the shortfall to the robustness of the authoritarian regimes in the region that had 
relied on one party’s seeking to consolidate power and oppress any opponents in the 
political realm. Once the Arab Spring started, many observers expressed hope and 
thought that the beginning of a fourth democratic wave that would lead to the fall of 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East; but, it was only a false start, as other observers 
had suspected. That false start is now evident following the events that occurred in the 
region, including the on-going civil war in Syria and political turmoil in Egypt, Libya, 
and Tunisia. 
In Egypt, the movement toward democracy started strong and united under one 
banner to overthrow President Mubarak. It took only 18 days for Mubarak to step down. 
One year following a democratic presidential election, Egyptian protestors returned to 
Tahrir Square demanding the resignation of democratically elected President Mohammed 
Morsi after he refused to sign the Tamarod petition or conduct an early election.1 During 
his one-year presidency, President Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood (MB) regime were 
heavily criticized. Many Egyptians called him a dictator who overreached for power and 
ruled by decree. Socioeconomic conditions in Egypt showed no signs of improvement 
and the MB regime excluded minorities from political participation. Furthermore, the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s overall ideology was not compatible with democracy. These are 
only a few of the many reasons that have been addressed by scholars to answer the 
question of why, after over 60 years of authoritarian regimes, democracy failed to take 
hold in Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood regime and President Mohammed Morsi, 
the first democratically elected president of Egypt? 
                                                 
1 David Butler et al., “Egypt: A Political Road Map,” 18 October 2013, 11, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/194701. 
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To come up with an objective answer to the question, this thesis will provides a 
thorough analysis to pinpoint the critical and most influential factors that hindered 
Egypt’s democratic transition. Specifically, it assesses the importance of each critical 
factor in relation to other causal factors. 
 IMPORTANCE B.
This thesis is important on two fronts. Theoretically, the study of Egypt’s 
democratic transition failure will be used as a test case for future democratic transitions in 
the Middle East. Strategically, United States’-Egyptian and Israeli-Egyptian relationships 
will be affected by this democratic shortfall. Additionally, the region can expect an 
escalation of terrorism. 
Democracy is new to the Middle East. If the issues that caused its failure under 
the MB can be identified, then valuable lessons can be learned that could help predict 
future transitions to democracy. There is no consensus among observers on the critical 
factors that led to the failure of Egypt’s democratic transition. Observers are divided 
between calling it a second revolution and/or a coup. With the exception of Turkey, 
which is geographically and culturally different from the rest of the Middle Eastern 
countries, and Lebanon, which does not have the same characteristics of authoritarian 
institutions as the rest of the Arab countries,2 there is no practical scenario to emulate and 
aid in understanding how a transition could be achieved in the Middle East, and Islamists 
could be integrated in the democratic process. 
Moreover, if it is found that Egypt is not ripe for democracy, then no matter 
which group is leading a democratic government, it would experience the same destiny as 
the MB. If this is the case, then it may be suggested that an authoritarian regime is the 
ideal regime for the Middle East, and that the European Union and the U.S. should not 
push authoritarian leaders to democratize. As a result of the Egyptian democratic 
transition’s short-fall and the ousting of the MB, this bitter experience may only lead to 
more terrorism as extremists believe that there is no possible compromise with seculars. 
                                                 
2 Seeberg Peter, “The EU as a Realist Actor in Normative Clothes: EU Democracy Promotion in 
Lebanon and the European Neighborhood Policy,” Democratization 16, no. 1 (2009): 81–99, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340802575858. 
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Since Morsi was deposed, security in the Sinai has deteriorated—52 Bedouin civilians 
and over 100 Egyptian security police have been killed.3 If the real cause of the 
democratic transition failure was not because of Egypt’s lack of readiness for democracy, 
but other factors, then this experience could teach and recommend suggestions to avoid 
similar mistakes. 
Strategically, certainly the ousting of the democratically elected Morsi changed 
the U.S. policy toward Egypt, leading to partially suspending military aid. Will the U.S. 
change this policy if the Obama administration is convinced that the military acted on 
behalf of the Egyptian people’s will? The decision to cut military aid could be seen by 
Egyptians and many other Arab country leaders as rushed and irrational. This decision 
could lead Egypt to ally with Russia and change its relationship with Israel. These issues 
demonstrate how Egypt holds a critical role in Middle Eastern stability, and a rational 
approach to the failure of the democratic transition should be examined. Until 
discovering the real causes, the U.S. should opt to support the Egyptian government’s 
undemocratic behavior and resume a normal relationship with its military in order to 
augment the capability of the latter to fight the jihadists in Sinai and the Suez Canal and 
restore peace in the region. 
Knowing the real causes of the toppling of the MB regime and the shortfall of the 
transition should help determine the critical milestones for a successful transition to 
democracy—not only in Egypt, but throughout the Middle East—as well as help provide 
suggestions to reshape U.S. policy in the region. 
 LITERATURE REVIEW C.
Many theories have been developed to explain transitions to democracy 
throughout three waves of democratization. While the first and second democratic waves 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were triggered by economic development, 
the general trend for the third democratic wave, which started around the 1980s, was 
driven by consensus and a commitment to democracy by elites. In this thesis, the author 
                                                 
3 Nicholas A. Heras, “Can the Sinai’s Bedouin Become a Counterterrorist Force?” Terrorism Monitor 
XI, no. 20 (2013): 6. 
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is considering modernization, political actors, the international environment, and 
institutional approaches—and will apply them to the case of Egypt’s transition in order to 
see how much influence they bear in explaining Egypt’s failure to transition to 
democracy. Also, the author will include scholarly analysis about President Morsi’s 
incompetent government, since many anti-Morsi observers claimed it as the main cause 
of the democratic failure. 
By 2007, under President Mubarak’s rule, the Egyptian economy observed an 
unprecedented economic boom, after which many independent analysts thought that 
sustained growth and neo-liberal reform were finally established.4 Huntington makes the 
argument that while modernity can lead to stability, it can also be a cause of instability, 
due to urbanization, rising expectations due to literacy, and the spread of media.5 Once 
the Egyptian economy started experiencing a downturn during this past decade, inflation, 
high unemployment, and class disparity became obvious. The gap between the poor and 
the rich began to widen, and the middle class that represents the majority of the populace 
began to fall into the poor class. Forty-five million Egyptians represent the middle-lower 
class and earn between $2.00 and $4.00 a day.6 Moreover, for political reasons, many 
Gulf countries cut financial support to Egypt when the MB came to power. Without 
public support, this disparate socioeconomic condition inherited from the previous 
regime became a challenge for Morsi and his government as they tried to lead Egypt to 
democracy. 
A lack of economic development would challenge and lengthen a transition to 
democracy but is not necessarily the reason for its failure. As Prezowski argues, 
“Democracy is exogenous. Modernization allows democracy to survive but does not 
produce democracy.”7 A comparative analysis with South American countries during the 
                                                 
4 Robert Springborg,”Egypt Too Big to Succeed?” in Handbook of Emerging Economies, ed. Robert 
Looney (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 397–414. 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2006), 33. 
6 Paul Rivlin,”Egyptian’s Economy after the Election,” Middle East Economy 1, no. 8 (2011, 
December): 3. 
7 Adam Przeworski, and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49 
(1997, January): 159. 
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third wave affirms this argument. With the exception of Brazil, which witnessed an 
economic boom, the general trend to democracy was related to economic liberalization 
and free trade that deepened the budget deficit. However, social unrest did not inhibit the 
transition to democracy. In 1980, Peru experienced low economic growth, extreme 
foreign debt, a deficit trade balance, and economic inequality.8 After the fall of its 
regime, the military permitted elections with a condition to safeguard its economic and 
political prerogatives. 
While modernization theory may be useful in predicting the endurance of 
democracy and likelihood of a transition to it, it does not explain the factors that 
contribute to a failing democratic transition. According to Huntington, if economic 
development increases political mobilization at a faster rate than the growth of 
democratic institutions, it will lead to political instability.9 As the society modernizes, its 
expectations will rise. The people will challenge the state if they are not able to realize 
their demands because of the absence of the proper institutions. Other scholars attribute 
the failure of Egypt’s transition to democracy to the weaknesses of political institutions, 
as evidenced by the limited role they have played since Mubarak’s regime. The 
institutional foundation of democracy in Egypt was limited, except for civil-society 
organizations, which emerged mainly to fulfill a social service role after the state was 
deemed inept at fulfilling its social contract. The only institutions that were considered 
competitive after the revolution were the military and the MB. The lack of democratic 
institutions contributed to a lack of rules for political actors to abide by in order to avoid 
political polarization and religious division among society. Therefore, without established 
rule and the absence of a legislative branch, President Morsi used his power to rule by 
decree under the pretext of protecting the democratic transition.10 
The institutional argument claims that the success or failure of a democracy is 
correlated to the presence of state institutions and civil organizations. The more 
                                                 
8 Terry Karl L. “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 
(1990): 4. 
9 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 74. 
10 Sally Roshdy, “Institutionalism in Egypt’s Transition to Democracy,” Mufta, July 1, 2013, 
http://muftah.org/institutionalism-in-egypts-transition-to-democracy. 
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developed and independent government institutions and civil-society are, the better 
chance there is for democracy to flourish. After Mubarak’s rule, the military stayed on as 
the most influential institution in Egypt and managed to keep its role at the forefront of 
Egyptian politics. The military’s political and economic interests would be put in 
jeopardy if the military submitted to civilian control; therefore, it is in the military best 
interests to block the transition to democracy. The MB, which emerged as the most 
powerful civilian institution after the revolution, had many changes to face in order to 
separate politics and religion, even though the MB showed some flexibility in mixing 
religion with political matters. The challenges that the MB faced were its exclusive 
behavior toward seculars and its reaction to social and political issues. From Brown and 
Elshobaki, it can be seen that there were two issues that may have inhibited the transition 
to democracy: first, to establish an Islamic society without being exclusive and to do so 
while maintaining public order; second, more liberals feared the Islamists than they 
feared the military during the transition that jeopardized democracy by creating an 
opportunity for the military to intervene.11 Except for the military and the MB, the 
government institutions were weak, and their role was only to serve the Mubarak regime. 
Also, the civil organizations were limited in their activities to provide social services and 
never played an active political role. During the transition, the military and the MB were 
the only institutions that were able to influence and compete without any opposition or 
rule of law to restrain their overreaching of power. 
While an institutional argument explains that after Mubarak’s regime, the weak 
institutions in Egypt contributed to the emergence of a non-democratic regime, this 
approach fails to account for individual behavior and decisions involved in this 
democratic process. Also, the absence of democratic institutions is expected during 
transition, and they can be developed along the way to democracy. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, with the exception of Poland and Hungary, which had established civil-
                                                 
11 Nathan J. Brown, Amr Elshobaki, Kristina Kausch, and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, The Egyptian 
Democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood (Report 10) (Paris, France: European Union, Institute for Security 
Studies, 2011), 24–27, http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/egyptian-democracy-and-the-
muslim-brotherhood. 
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society organizations before their transitions, other Eastern European countries lacked 
institutions and civil-societies yet were able to transition to democracy.12 
The contingent (political actors) approach emphasizes the importance of the 
elites’ commitment to democracy as the driver for success. While economic development 
is likely to drive democracy, political leaders are a must to make it happen.13 During the 
transition to democracy, these actors will run into conflicts of interest, but they have to 
stay united against an authoritarian regime and remain committed to democracy in order 
to succeed. Dankart Rustow in Transition to Democracy states that democracy is a long 
process of “inclusive political struggle.”14 In Egypt, instead of all political forces coming 
together around the rules of transition and a plan accepted by a large majority of elites, 
there was a division among the political actors, which contributed to an ethnic and 
religious disunion within the society. The youth believed that the revolution that they 
supported was being derailed from its sole purpose of restoring dignity, and they split 
from their sponsored political parties. The Salafists claimed that the MB was not 
committed to adopting Sharia. The liberals, nationalists, and leftists claimed that the MB 
was overreaching for power and undermining its opponents. Religious minorities and 
women were underrepresented, and the National Democratic Party (NDP) was prohibited 
from participating. Political parties in Egypt failed to form a pact to stand strong against 
any force that could jeopardize democracy. They did not compromise and settle their 
differences to provide some minimum guarantee to all actors involved in the democratic 
process. Without setting any rules for the transition, the Islamists dominated the 
parliament and crafted a constitution that suited them, and the oppositions felt that the 
MB were self-serving and had hijacked their revolution. On the other hand, the MB 
claimed that opponents refused to negotiate when they were offered the opportunity to do 
so, and they were not capable of developing a moderate discourse or a strategy of accord. 
Instead, the opposition continued to oppose the MB and the government by refusing to 
                                                 
 12 Miller E. Laurel et al., Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the 
Globe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1192. 
13 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991): 33–34. 
14 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative 
Politics 2, no. 3 (1970): 352, http://www.jstor.org/stable/421307. 
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cooperate and demanding the overthrow of President Morsi. Without a doubt, the MB 
and its opponents failed to compete democratically. But, each side has its own 
explanation of why the other caused the failure. The puzzling question that still does not 
have an obvious answer is what side refused to cooperate and compromise? 
The international approach emphasizes that the presence of global and regional 
democratic powers, economic interdependence, and international organizations contribute 
to a smooth democratic transition.15 In the case of Egypt, the international factors did not 
play a positive role in driving Egypt’s transition to democracy in the same way that it 
helped Eastern European countries. The fall of the Soviet Union, the lack of a market 
economy, and their desire to join the European Union all influenced Eastern European 
countries to consolidate under democracy. By contrast, Egypt is more influenced by the 
Gulf countries, which are far from being democratic. While other countries received 
foreign aid during their democratic transitions, the Gulf countries cut their support to 
Egypt once the MB came to power. Also, countries have become democratic because of 
their proximity to other democratic countries; this was not the case for Egypt. On the 
contrary, the civil war in Syria and at the pressure from Saudi Arabia against democracy 
that was expressed by military support to crack down on demonstrators in Bahrain, 
clearly signify the lack of support for democratic reform in the region.16 The intention of 
the Gulf countries not to support an Egyptian transition to democracy was apparent after 
the financial support that Egypt received soon after the overthrow of President Morsi. 
Egypt was not constrained by international conditions to transition to democracy. On the 
contrary, its regional influence favored the country’s focus on its domestic environment. 
External support is important in transitioning to democracy; however, it does not play an 
essential role in the failure of democracy, especially when all political actors are 
committed to democracy and socioeconomic conditions are suitable to promote it. 
                                                 
15Philip C. Schmitter, “The Internatioanl Context of Contemporary Democratization,” Stanford 
Journal of International Affairs 2 (1993): 1–34. 
16 Jason, Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, “Why the Modest Harvest?” Journal of 
Democracy 24, no. 4 (2013): 29–44. 
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Many observers, such as Roshdy, Brown, and Rugman, attributed the failure of 
democracy in Egypt to the incompetence of President Morsi’s government.17 In addition 
to the deepened economic crisis and repression of human rights, security deteriorated and 
attacks on religious minorities escalated. Additionally, terrorism in the Sinai and the Suez 
zone became an issue. In this context, the military involved itself only enough to restore 
security for the Egyptians. Moreover, the lack of efforts to communicate with the 
Egyptian population about the national economic crisis along with the unpopular 
economic reforms provoked a revolt against the rise of gas prices. In defense of the MB, 
many Morsi sympathizers claimed that the “deep state” worked to keep President Morsi 
from power.18 While the MB regime was in power, it did not have the support of the 
judiciary, police, army, or media. President Morsi was determined to stop the corruption 
and interference of the deep state. Evidence of that claim was that after President Morsi 
was ousted, fuel shortage and power outages returned to normal and the police returned 
to the street. 
Each of these approaches—modernization, institution, contingent, and 
international—presents one set of explanations of factors that address the failed 
democratic transition in Egypt, and each of these factors has a different correlation 
weight of causation. While the general trend for the failure of democracy in Egypt was 
the inability of elites to settle their differences and agree on the rules of the transition by 
providing guarantees to all political actors, which would have allowed them to be 
included in decision making, the elites’ decisions and motivations were shaped by 
institutional, socioeconomic, and international influences. 
                                                 
17Sally Roshdy, “Institutionalism in Egypt’s Transition to Democracy,” Muftah, last modified March 
1, 2014, http://muftah.org/institutionalism-in-egypts-transition-to-democracy; Jonathan Rugman, “Egypt: 
Democracy in the Balance,” Catham House, July 11, 2013; Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s Failed Transition,” 
Journal of Democracy 24, no. 4 (2013): 45–58, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1465268972?accountid=12702. 
18 Nur Laiq, Talking to Arab Youth: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Egypt and Tunisia (New 
York, NY: International Peace Institute, 2013), 44. 
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 PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES D.
This thesis will derive three hypotheses from the approaches addressed in the 
literature review: modernization theory, political actors, and international environment 
approaches. Also, based on the literature, the author will include the hypothesis of the 
deep state and dissatisfied economic elites. The analysis of these four hypotheses will 
depict a larger picture of all possible factors that may have intervened and hindered the 
democratic transition in Egypt. 
Before July 3, 2013, some scholars, such as Springborg and Neriah, predicted that 
the military would block the transition path to democracy and overthrow Morsi’s 
government to preserve its military’s political and economic prerogatives.19 Others, such 
as Brown, claimed that the disagreement between seculars and the MB over issues 
regarding the rules of transition and the lack of proper democratic institutions pushed the 
military to intervene.20 Those who were anti-Morsi claimed that his government was 
incompetent and exclusive, and they called for military intervention. Finally, those who 
were pro-Morsi claimed that his government was sabotaged by the deep state and 
Mubarak loyalists, who had been waiting on the sidelines since Mubarak stepped down. 
All these suggestions fail to reveal the whole truth of what caused the shortfall of the MB 
on its path to democracy and the toppling of the Morsi regime. In the absence of a general 
consensus about Egypt’s democratic failure, and in order to achieve an objective 
conclusion, this thesis considers the four hypotheses, and then analyzes and discusses 
them to affirm which factors led the military to intervene in Egypt’s democratic 
transition. 
1. Hypothesis 1: Egypt’s Non-readiness for Democracy 
Egypt’s economic crisis may have hindered the transition to democracy. Due to 
inflation and a high unemployment rate, the budget deficit was expected to reach 11 
                                                 
19 Jacques Neriah, “Egypt after Morsi: The Defeat of Political Islam,” Jerusalem Centre for Public 
Affairs 13, no 19 (2013), http://jcpa.org/article/egypt-after-morsi-the-defeat-of-political-islam/#; Robert 
Springborg, “Democratic Control of the Egyptian Armed Forces: Wait Sitting Down,” paper presented at 
Royal Danish Defense College, Copenhagen, Denmark, April 25–26, 2013. 
20 Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s Failed Transition,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 4 (2013): 45–46, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1465268972?accountid=12702. 
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percent in 2013.21 This is an indication of the economic crisis that Egypt was facing and 
continues to face. The gap between the poor and the rich is widening, and the middle 
class that represents the majority of the populace is falling to the poor class. Forty-five 
million Egyptians represent the middle lower class and earn between $2.00 and $4.00 a 
day.22 Foreign direct investment and tourism sector revenues have decreased because of 
the lack of security and the political instability that Egypt has witnessed over the last 
three years.  
2. Hypothesis 2: Failure of Political Actors to Form a Pact 
The failure to agree on a long-lasting pact, in which all parties could achieve a 
compromise on the “rules of the game” in the transition to democracy and a guaranteed 
minimum interest for each party, contributed to Egypt’s democratic transition failure. The 
division between liberals, nationalists, leftists, and Islamists created political chaos and 
provided an opportunity for Mubarak’s remaining supporters and the military to 
capitalize on and overthrow President Morsi. 
3. Hypothesis 3: The Hostility of the Gulf States toward Democracy and 
the Limited Support from the International Community 
After the Arab Spring, the Gulf countries took an assertive stand toward shaping 
regional policies, especially after the U.S. shifted its interests from the Gulf region to 
East Asia. Egypt is the largest recipient of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) financial 
assistance. Except for Qatar, the rest of the Gulf countries cut their assistance to Egypt 
once the MB came to power. Gulf financial aid resumed after the ousting of Morsi. The 
MB was considered to be shifting more toward an Iranian influence rather than a GCC 
influence, in which case Morsi’s policies would have created chaos in the Middle East. 
This uncertainty may have led the GCC to influence the military to influence what type 
of regime to replace Mubarak’s regime. 
                                                 
21 Paul Rivlin, “Egyptian’s Economy after the Election,” Tel Aviv University, Middle East Economy 
1, no. 8 (2011): 3. 
22 Ibid. 
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4. Hypothesis 4: The Deep State and Dissatisfied Economic Elite 
Mubarak’s regime is still present, and many of Mubarak’s loyalists hold positions 
that could have allowed them to derail any democratic reform. The fear of civilian control 
over the military and loss of political and economic interests as a result of a democracy 
may have caused the military to intervene and block the transition to democracy. The 
economic elite, mainly those who were close to the army and the old regime, lost many 
incentives during the MB rule, as well as during the economic crisis that the country has 
witnessed over the last three years. These actors had enough incentive to sabotage the 
transition to democracy and ally with the military to overthrow the MB. 
 METHODS AND SOURCES  E.
To understand the critical factors that led the military to intervene in the transition 
to democracy and overthrow a democratically elected government, this thesis will focus 
primarily on recent journals published by scholars, as well as news from both sides: pro-
Morsi, such as Al-Jazeera, and anti-Morsi, such as Al-Arabia, from the first Arab Spring 
until today. Additionally, the thesis will depend on theoretical approaches that explain 
factors in the transitions to democracy and apply them in the case of Egypt, such as 
modernization, political actors, and international approaches. Also, the author will use 
some studies published before the ousting of Mubarak to help understand the behaviors 
of the actors involved, from the Nasser era until recently, especially the military and the 
MB. Taking into consideration these actors’ pasts and how they evolved and changed will 
add more understanding of their recent behavior and rational decisions. The MB and the 
military have shared a variegated past filled with appeasement and confrontation during 
the last 60 years. If a historic trend of the Egyptian military can be identified, then its 
motivation to intervene after the Arab Spring can be better understood. Also, by 
understanding the MB’s evolution since its inception, its behavior during the last two 
years may be explained. 
 THESIS OVERVIEW F.
Chapters I, II, and III will provide an overview of the theoretical approaches to 
transitions to democracy (modernization, political actors, and international environment 
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theories). After the overview of each of those theories, investigation of Egypt’s 
democratic transition in light of these approaches will be provided. Also, throughout the 
thesis the author will provide comparisons to past democratic transitions. The intent of 
these chapters is to validate whether these approaches explain the possible factors that 
inhibited Egypt’s democratic transition. 
In Chapter IV, the author will address the thesis’s last assumption that the deep 
state and economic elite’s dissatisfaction hindered the transition. This chapter will focus 
on discussing the role and influence of the deep state and economic elite in domestic and 
foreign affairs before and after President Morsi came to power, as well as their 
motivations in blocking the democratic transition. In each of the chapters, the thesis will 
summarize findings on the causes of the failed transition. 
Chapter V will evaluate the evidence to analyze which factors contributed most to 
the failure of Egypt’s democratic transition. Finally, in the conclusion, the thesis will 
summarize the key findings of this study and offer lessons learned and recommendations 
for future democratic transitions in the Middle East. 
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II. EGYPT’S NON–READINESS FOR DEMOCRACY 
 MODERNIZATION THEORY A.
Modernization theory focuses on structural and social conditions. Most scholars 
who examine modernization theory seek to understand and explain the relationship 
between socioeconomic development and democracy, specifically, whether poor 
countries are less likely to transition to democracy than rich countries. According to 
Seymour Lipset, economic development is correlated to democracy, “the more well-to-do 
a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”23 For a democratic 
regime to survive, it has to provide sufficient economic and social services in order for its 
citizens to perceive it as a legitimate regime. Lipset emphasizes the importance of the 
middle class in achieving inclusive growth through pursuing political interests in a 
democratic environment. The middle class is a necessary condition for a democratic 
culture to emerge because it will push for changes. The middle class is the only class that 
is able to change a regime’s behavior and achieve its political goals by pursuing 
democratic behavior that encourages peaceful conflict resolution and avoids violence. 
The lower class is generally only focused on economic interests and is rarely involved in 
politics. On the other hand, the upper class is always interested in maintaining its status 
quo, since any political change could jeopardize its wealth and political status. 
Similar to Lipset, Przeworski et al emphasize the role of growth, arguing that a 
country has to pass a certain threshold of development in order for democracy to survive; 
but, it does not cause it to transition to democracy.24 Economic development and 
industrialization allow not only the emergence of democracy, but also allow authoritarian 
regimes to endure. In his model, Przeworski concludes that when a democratic country 
reaches a certain level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, it is hard to reverse to 
an undemocratic regime. On the contrary, states in transition to democracy lacking 
                                                 
23 Lipset, Seymour Martin, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (1959, March): 75, doi:10.2307/1951731. 
24 Przeworski, Adam, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Michael E. Alvarez, Fernando Limongi. 2000. 
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-being in the World, 1950–1990 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 100–1. 
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economic development and not reaching the threshold GDP will face great risk to go 
back to authoritarian regimes—such as the example of some African countries during the 
third democratic wave. Sub-Saharan Africa’s patrimonial regimes relied on single party 
politics, “clientelism,” and repression of civil liberties. Patrimonial regimes fell once 
leaders of those states were not able to support their political agenda and pacify their 
clientele. Only a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa transitioned to democracy; Kenya, 
Cameroon, and Ivory Coast’s old regime leaders manipulated the political process and 
returned to power;25 Mali’s democratic government was deposed by a military coup in 
2012.26 
In general, economic development leads to the growth of industrialization, 
urbanization, wealth, and education. In his examination of economic development, Lipset 
refers to sustained economic growth or the economic development achieved by Western 
countries.27 In Western society, wealth is more equally distributed among citizens and the 
gap between the poor and rich is less wide than in developing countries. In Western 
society, the middle class is the dominant class where higher education and social services 
are brought about through its political participation and democratic tolerance. On the 
contrary, when there is a lack of redistribution of wealth, society will be divided between 
a large impoverished class and small ruling elite and would result in oligarchy or in 
tyranny, as is the case in most developing countries.28 
While Przeworski rejects the hypothesis that economic development causes the 
emergence of democracy, Boix and Stokes argue that economic growth alone is not 
sufficient for transition to democracy—it is rather income equality generated from 
economic growth that is necessary for democratic transition.29 Under this concept, Boix 
                                                 
25 Nicolas Van de Walle, “Africa’s Range of Regimes,” Journal of democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 71. 
26 “Tuareg Rebels in Mali Declare Independence: Part of an African Awakening for Self-
Determination?” Democracy Now, accessed 01April 2014, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2012/4/9/tuareg_rebels_in_mali_declare_independence. 
27 Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” 
75. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” World Politics 55, no. 04 (2003):  
539–540, doi:10.1353/wp.2003.0019. 
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and Stokes agree with Lipset and reveal that economic development accompanied by 
income equality contributes to the creation of a large middle class. In the absence of the 
middle class, the social structure is dominated by a large poor class and small elite class, 
which seeks favoritism from the state. Reciprocally, the state seeks its support from the 
elite to preserve its legitimacy. The lack of a large middle class is what leads to 
corruption, which then leads to a lack of economic development and income inequality. 
The higher the degree of inequality, the more the elites have to lose and the more they are 
reluctant to shift to democracy, because democracy will divert the means of production 
and the rich will be more highly taxed to allow for an equal redistribution.30 In contrast, 
democracy is more likely to occur when it is less likely to threaten the elites. In this case, 
the degree of inequality is low and the middle class represents the majority of society. 
In sum, modernization and income equality lead to changes in social conditions 
that foster a pro-democratic culture initiated by the dominance of the middle class. 
Modernization increases the chances of a society’s receptiveness to resolve differences, 
negotiate, avoid conflicts, undermine radicals and extremists, and give legitimacy to 
democratic political parties. In this chapter, the thesis will examine the significance of the 
modernization theory in the case of Egypt’s failure of transition to democracy under the 
MB. 
 EGYPT NOT RIPE FOR DEMOCRACY B.
Egyptians are more worried about the worsening of their economic conditions 
than their political situation; they experience inflation, a high unemployment rate, and 
class disparity. In Egypt, the gap between the poor and rich is widening, and the middle 
class that represents the majority of the population is falling down to the poor class. 
Forty-five million Egyptians represent the low middle class and earn between $2.00 and 
$4.00 a day.31 
                                                 
30 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson,” A Theory of Political Transitions,” American Economic 
Review 91, no. 4 (2001):957, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677820. 
31 Rivlin, “Egyptian’s Economy after the Election,” 3. 
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By 2007, under President Mubarak’s rule, the Egyptian economy had observed an 
unprecedented economic boom, after which many independent analysts thought that the 
sustained growth and neo-liberal reform that the country was moving toward was finally 
established.32 However, under the MB, Egypt faced challenges from social unrest, 
political instability, and lack of security. Many observers expected Egypt not to rebound 
from the contemporary economic crisis quickly enough nor achieve rates of growth 
sufficient for a democratic regime to survive. This socioeconomic conditions inherited 
from the previous regime became a challenge for President Morsi and his government as 
they tried to lead Egypt to democracy. This chapter provides an analysis of the Egyptian 
economic crisis, widespread corruption, and degradation of its middle class, which all 
contributed to the failure of transition to democracy during the MB. 
1. Egypt’s Current Economic Crisis 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected Egyptian economic growth to 
be around 1.5 percent in 2011, compared to the average economic growth of 5.5 percent 
under the Mubarak regime.33 It would have been almost impossible to see an economic 
growth rate in a brief period similar to the one witnessed by Egypt from 1990 to 2010. A 
1.5 percent growth is not enough growth to offset the population growth of 1.7 percent a 
year.34 This disparity between economic growth and population growth could only 
worsen the economic situation and is likely to lead to a catastrophic economic decline. 
Moreover, the high rate of unemployment is expected to be out of control for years as the 
Egyptian labor force grows faster than the market growth. Every year, almost 1.5 million 
Egyptians are added to the labor force compared to the only 250,000 new jobs that the 
market force can sustain.35 At this rate, Egypt will witness an addition of 1,250,000 
unemployed per year.36 With the economic decline, over the last decade, it has become 
impossible for the Egyptian labor market to absorb the increased labor force, especially 
                                                 
32 Springborg, “Egypt too Big to Succeed?” 397–9. 
33 Rivlin, “Egyptian’s Economy after the Election,” 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Ibid. 
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those with college degrees. It is hard for these youth to find government or private job 
that reflects their credentials. Unfortunately, the lack of family ties to government 
officials or to the Egyptian bourgeois exclude them from obtaining competitive jobs. 
Nonetheless, to start a business, upfront cash is required as credit by banks, red tape and 
dealing with corrupt officials is not deemed an alternative. 
Financially, Morsi’s government experienced a difficult task in managing its 
fiscal deficit and implementing new fiscal policies that could save the country from its 
debts. The budget deficit was 11 percent of GDP in 2012, and it was expected to reach 13 
percent in 2013.37 With a downgrade of Egypt’s credit rating to B-, the government 
thought that the only solution to manage the budget deficit and pay its debts was through 
domestic loans with high interest rates that exceeded 14 percent, rather than low rate of 
three percent from the IMF.38 But IMF conditions put the Egyptian government in an 
awkward situation, especially with what was happening with Egypt’s social unrest. In 
order for the IMF to provide financial assistance, Egypt would have had to implement a 
fiscal reform, which consisted of an increase on the tax system through value added taxes 
and a reduction of subsidies to improve the efficiency of public spending. The 
government realized that such reforms would only accentuate public unrest as many 
protestors across the country expressed their anger toward it.39 Among those who 
opposed the IMF loan were the Salafists and opponents of the ideas of capitalism. The 
former believe that interest on loans is against the principles of Islam, or “haram,” and 
the latter are convinced that Egypt could survive without foreign loans, especially since 
the neoliberal policy that the country undertook was the cause of the Egyptian economic 
crisis. 
The government’s decision to finance its budget deficit through domestic lenders 
would not allow the government to escape its economic decline—on the contrary; it was 
only going to worsen it. As a solution, to gain liquidity for its short term debts, the 
                                                 
37 Mohammed Samhouri, “Egypt’s Hard Economic Choices,” Sada, accessed 24 March 2014, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=50800&solr_hilite=Egypt. 
38 Rivlin, “Egyptian’s Economy after the Election,” 4. 
39 Ibid., 3–5. 
 20
Egyptian Central Bank increased the interest rates in order to increase funds and 
encourage savings; however, with high interest rates, investors would be discouraged to 
invest in the economy and create jobs to solve the unemployment issues.40 The budget 
deficit was aggravated under the MB’s rule as the government decided to increase the 
minimum wage and extend over 450,000 contractual jobs in the public service.41 During 
this time, only the government was creating jobs; the private sector was lagging behind 
with the global economy stagnation and rational private businessmen kept their money in 
banks, rather than investing and taking huge risks with the declining Egyptian economy. 
Many observers disagreed with the government’s decision to dry up all liquidity 
from the market and increase the interest rates, especially when the structure of the 
Egyptian economy is taken into consideration. Unlike developed countries, the 
manufacturing sector is not yet developed in Egypt. The Egyptian economy relies on FDI 
and small businesses to absorb 40 percent of the labor force and participate in 30 percent 
of the GDP.42 
The tourism industry suffered a huge setback because of the political unrest and 
the absence of security that Egypt has experienced since the 2011 revolution. The 
Egyptian economy relies on tourism for foreign currency inflow to pay its trade deficit 
and keep thousands of jobs for semiskilled and unskilled workers. In 2011, after the 
revolution, the tourism industry fell by 16 percent; its performance decreased drastically 
since the MB came to power and failed to establish security. As a result, many countries 
banned their citizens from traveling to Egypt.43 
Not only tourism, but also foreign investments suffered due to the political and 
security instability in Egypt. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) accounted for almost 25 
percent of all investment in Egypt before the 2011 revolution. Since then, foreign 
investors have been pulling out of Egypt as security risks are too high. To curb the 
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outflow of capital, the central bank put a restriction on the amount of money that could be 
carried out of the country as the foreign currency reserve was drying up. Since late 2008, 
foreign investments from the Gulf declined as a result of the drop of the petrodollar; total 
foreign investments from oil producers accounted for 50 percent of total foreign 
investments, mainly in real estate and tourism. Hence, a comparable Gulf petrodollar 
inflow to Egypt without high prices of crude oil and established security and stability in 
Egypt is not expected.44 
Military overspending and involvement in the economy will always be an 
obstacle toward economic growth. The military accounts for half a million personnel—a 
number which does not include the count of total staff of the Minister of the Interior, 
which totals two million personnel. The military is the most powerful organization in the 
politics and economy of Egypt; it has acquired more and more influence with every 
regime transformation since 1952. Contrary to other countries’ military, including the 
heavily dependent military of South Africa, the ratio of soldiers to civilians in Egypt is 
far greater with one soldier to 40 civilians.45 
Under the Muslim Brotherhood, the military gained more ground and influence as 
it managed to obtain the exclusive power to oversee its own budget. The Egyptian 
military has a stake in the Egyptian economy by managing companies in several 
industries as well as owning land. Because of its confidential budget, there is no official 
amount for the military’s income. Experts estimate that the military controls one-third of 
the Egyptian economy.46 The military-controlled companies would be more efficient and 
profitable if they were run privately, and not by military officers who are not business 
minded. Such industries would keep the unemployment rate lower, if they were 
privatized and were not exploited by the military. 
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A military reform would help smooth a transition to democracy, but military 
reform taking place as long as the military is not under civilian control is not expected. 
Military reform is not a solution that was thought of just recently; it was introduced by 
President Sadat. President Mubarak was reluctant to introduce the idea of a modern and 
non-operational military, as he saw that the military employs around 800,000 personnel 
yearly.47 
The military-controlled economy is a huge problem in Egypt. The military takes 
advantage of the political turbulence and security unrest to gain even more ground and 
extend its prerogatives. A successful transition to democracy would jeopardize the 
military’s political and economic interests as it would then have to submit to civilian 
control, forcing it to modernize and cut down its forces. 
2. Corruption 
After Sadat’s economic reform, infitah, Mubarak followed in the steps of his 
predecessor by gradually implementing economic reform and promoting new business-
class elites who made quick fortunes. Unlike Nassir, Sadat and Mubarak, due to 
international pressure from the IMF and World Bank, liberalized the economy to 
legitimize and strengthen their own regimes. The new business class that emerged from 
these economic reforms became Mubarak’s loyalists along with his ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP).48 To ensure his regime’s survival and legitimacy, without 
elevating the effects of cutting his social contracts with his citizens, Mubarak relied on 
his crony capitalists to fill the void in “votes” in exchange for “government perks.”49 
Corruption became a common practice when businessmen found their way to the 
parliament, NDP, and cabinet ministries and used these positions to acquire or become 
brokers in selling and renting government-owned businesses. This was the strategy that 
Mubarak established with the businessmen elites; they had to either integrate into the 
regime to achieve economic benefits or risk their economic interests if they opposed it. 
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Mustapha al-Said, chairman of the Parliament’s economic affairs committee, declared, 
“Many businessmen believe their NDP memberships afford them safe haven for financial 
shenanigans, and that they join the NDP for that very reason.”50 The example of 
Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman, a former Minister of Housing is a good illustration of misuse 
of office power and widespread of corruption. Soliman used his power to transfer 8,000 
acres of land to one of his close colleagues, a member of the NDP, for free, in order for 
the latter to use as collateral for a bank loan.51 Soliman also sold some state-owned land 
in Cairo to a real estate businessman for a fifth of the land’s estimated value.52 
The business class and the NDP, along with the government’s deep involvement 
in the economy, allowed the emergence of a corrupted system. The system is difficult to 
break or fight since the judicial and legislative branches are involved in it.53 From this 
standpoint, the widespread corruption in Egypt became a major obstacle to democracy. 
The system created by Mubarak is a system that is incompatible with democracy, 
especially when political reform could jeopardize the elite’s interests and perhaps cause 
the fall of the regime. Therefore, the Egyptian business class has stood fast against 
promoting civil society and effective participation in politics. According to a recent study 
conducted by a team of Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS), 
71.1 percent of Egyptian businessmen believe that their interests align with the state’s 
interests.54 Contrary to the Egyptian business class, its counterpart in Latin America was 
the class that inspired the transition to democracy through its active political participation 
and advancement to civil society.55 
Three factors that are attributed to the emergence of civil society are: “autonomy 
from the regime,” “a pro-democracy agenda,” and building a democratic coalition.56 
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None of these prerequisites existed in the case of Egypt. Over the last decade, Egypt 
witnessed the appearance of many civil society organizations, but they were fragmented, 
behaved in an authoritarian manner, and promoted corruption.57 Most of these civil 
society organizations were co-opted and integrated into the regime. Their leaders resisted 
rotation of office since stepping down from leadership positions could risk the loss of 
privileges gained from supporting the regime. For instance, Mubarak’s regime 
maintained a strong hold on labor unions and used them as an “arm of the state.” The 
government appointed its leaders and empowered them to suppress workers and 
undermine their rights. 
Mubarak’s regime gained expertise in promoting uncivil society organizations by 
creating laws and rules that restricted the activities of citizens. Under Law 84/2002, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), which is the authoritative body to disband any 
association, approved the appointments of NGO boards of directors and penalized any 
association viewed as a threat to public order.58 Those laws were a few of the constraints 
used by the regime to curtail the emergence of a democratic society and to maintain its 
status-quo. Contrary to the Egyptian’s civil society organization (CSO), Eastern Europe 
and Asia’s CSOs took advantage of economic crises to mobilize and challenge the 
democratic credentials of their regimes. The economic crisis in Indonesia motivated 
many CSOs there to stir dissatisfied citizens, and pressure President Shurato toward 
democratic reforms.59 
While corruption inhibited democratic reforms, it also impeded Egyptian 
economic growth for a long time. The worldwide governance indicator (WGI) reported 
that the corruption index was rising while Egypt was ranked 112 out of 142 countries in 
2011.60 The crony capitalism system that the country was involved in by culture and/or 
due to greedy capitalists was the main reason for Egypt’s economic degradation and high 
corruption. During Mubarak’s rule, few independent businessmen were lucky enough to 
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launch their business ventures, since most of the business opportunities had to be blessed 
by Mubarak’s close family and friends so they could take a part of the profits of any 
business deals. The Mubarak era observed an economic development that served his 
family and its inner circle’s interests. Special deals were passed in favor of the latter 
awarding them land allocations and natural gas and construction contracts. Corruption 
was a sort of disease that spread from the top-down to include average Egyptian citizens, 
police, and government officers. There was no chance to deal without paying a bribe, or a 
bakchich. Everything privilege was bought and sold; to get any kind of permit 
(transportation, construction), to apply for a job, or other activities of daily life, citizens 
were required to bribe officials. According to Alfred Raouf, the legacy that Mubarak left 
after the January 25 Revolution was one of corrupted cadres, the only few who could run 
and manage the government.61 During Mubarak’s time, only one university offered a 
public administration program in the whole country, and only Mubarak’s ruling party 
(NDP) could benefit from this program.62 Most of the experienced government officials 
had graduated from this school, and they were habituated to corruption. This was the 
deep state that faced President Morsi during Egypt’s attempted transition to democracy 
and that stayed loyal to the old regime. 
In addition, corruption blocked foreign capital from entering Egypt. Foreign 
investors experienced hardship adjusting to the corruption and getting their businesses 
running. Many were forced to adapt, yet others quit because of conflicting business laws 
in investors’ home countries and Egyptian regulations and culture. Saudi Arabian and 
U.S. investors withdrew $58 million from the financial sector within five months of their 
entering the Egyptian financial market because of corruption.63 In U.S. business law, 
exchanging gifts valued over $2,500 is prohibited, as well as any expenses outside of 
regular business norms such as paying for government officials to expedite business 
processes (business permits, court disputes, and customs declarations). These expenses 
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cannot be written off, and it is against U.S. business law to get involved with such 
business conduct. Many Western investors found themselves between controversial 
alternatives: either they tolerated misconduct, or had to suffer the hideous established 
business and legal processes. In a World Bank report, Egypt was reported as one of the 
lowest ranked countries in “ease of doing business.”64 
In sum, the widespread corruption and the interconnection of the business class 
and Mubarak’s regime inhibited the business class from effectively participating in 
promoting a healthy civil society and continuous economic growth. Instead, both the 
regime and the business class maintained the status-quo and continued to suppress 
democratic associations. Any change in the regime would jeopardize their interests, 
especially a democratic regime that would call for a redistribution of wealth. As 
corruption became the norm for doing business in Egypt, economic growth slowed as 
many foreign investors found it difficult to compete in such a corrupt business 
environment. 
3. Liberalism and Extinction of the Middle Class 
Egypt’s economic crisis is a symptom of a bigger problem—the disappearance of 
the Egyptian middle class over the last thirty years. The marginalization of the middle 
class started with the economic liberalization initiated during the Sadat era and concluded 
with Mubarak’s full privatization in 1991. According to Dai Xiaoqi, in one decade the 
Egyptian middle class shrunk dramatically  
The percentage of the upper class in the total population in 1991 was 3%, 
the middle class made up 45%, and the lower class 52%. In 2006, the 
upper class accounted for 18.4%, the middle class 12.4%, and the lower 
class 69.1%.65  
Because of the unsustainable economic growth, only a few people from the 
middle class moved to the upper class; the majority slid down to the lower class. The 
privatization of the state owned enterprises forced many Egyptians from the middle class 
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to retire, and private owners maintained low wages, despite inflation. Also, the 1996 land 
reform deprived many farmers of their lands on which they depended to survive, pushing 
down this population from middle to low-class as well.66 The rich peasants who owned 
lands and provided most of the jobs and social and financial services for many Egyptians 
were replaced by new business elites and their ability to support Egyptian peasants in 
rural areas diminished.67 
The middle class, which was the base of support during Nasser’s time, lost its 
economic and political status—this left Mubarak to rely on the upper class to gain 
support and legitimacy. The quality of life decreased drastically for the middle class 
during the last two decades. In addition to the difficulties of finding a decent paying job, 
many middle class people were forced to look for an informal second job, such as 
working part-time as taxi drivers or working at a shop to maintain their status. With the 
fall of living conditions of the middle class, it became difficult for this class to commit to 
social development and further prosperity of the country. As corruption became a 
common practice in Egypt, much of the middle class and many educated Egyptians 
migrated to Gulf and Western countries, while others traded their political power for 
money. The rest “took a back seat” and lost confidence and interest in making changes to 
the Egyptian political landscape. Those who participated first in the overthrow of 
Mubarak and later of Morsi were mainly youth from the middle-class—those who were 
able to afford computers and access the internet to rally Egyptians to the streets. Once 
they reached their goals in overthrowing the regime, they stopped short of reaching 
power. They were limited in their ability to foresee what regime might come next 
because of their inexperience in the political arena. More than that, these youth became 
tools for third parties to achieve political goals, yet they were left out of any political 
decisions. The Egyptian political and economic crisis will be resolved once the middle-
class regains its economic and political strength and again represents the majority of 
social class in Egypt. The middle class is the engine of the economy; it is the class that 
feeds Egypt with high skilled workers that the economy and foreign investors are looking 
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for. Furthermore, it is the class that is most likely to stimulate the domestic economy and 
invest in small and medium enterprises to create jobs. 
According to the World Economic Forum, Egypt is ranked 126th out of 134 
countries in higher education performance producing skilled labor.68 Without quality 
education that is affordable, the government is failing to meet the needs of the labor 
market for skilled workers. These skilled job positions maintain the survival of the 
middle-class and its growth, when educated lower-class citizens move up the ladder. 
Also, empowering women by affording them opportunities in education and employment 
will further strengthen the middle-class. The female labor force in Egypt represents 24 
percent of the total male labor force.69 Booz and Company estimated that Egypt’s GDP 
will increase by over 30 percent when the employment rate of women matches that of 
men.70 However, this cannot be achieved without education and the promotion of 
women’s rights. 
The lesson learned from former President Mubarak’s rule is that Egypt needs 
economic development—an inclusive plan—and not just economic growth measured by 
GDP per capita. For sustainable growth that is able to lessen poverty, Egypt needs to 
prioritize education, promote human rights and working conditions. It especially needs an 
economic plan that is oriented equitably to underdeveloped regions and villages to 
minimize the dislocation of society from their original habitats. Such an inclusive plan 
would be a long term plan; in the meantime, a short term reform plan should be initiated. 
An immediate action for economic reform is a necessity for the Egyptian 
government in order to escape further economic collapse. Many Egyptian economists 
voted for fiscal reform early during the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule, but the government 
was hesitant to make such a reform as it was worried about social unrest and political 
instability. The Egyptian government, under and after President Morsi has experienced a 
socioeconomic dilemma. In his article “Can Egypt’s Transition and Economy Be Saved?” 
                                                 




Hafez Ghanem said that it is a “no-win situation.”71 On one hand, with a fiscal reform, 
the population could revolt and social unrest would permeate society, while on the other 
hand, without fiscal reform, inflation could rise higher and an economic crisis most likely 
would prevail and result in further social unrest and public instability.72 Even though it is 
not easy for a government in transition to convince its people to buy into a fiscal reform 
plan, at this time the Egyptian government has no other choice. The government has to 
reduce subsidies and increase taxes, or at least come up with a better plan in which only 
poor people benefit from subsidies but not everyone. Implementation of such a plan is 
determined by how much the government, private and political parties, and civil society 
are willing to compromise, as well as how much sacrifice the Egyptian people are willing 
to make to save their country from inescapable economic and social collapse. 
This argument is not about the need of an economic reform in Egypt after the 
overthrow of Mubarak. It is an argument about the difficulty of having implemented such 
reform during the time of President Morsi, and after, especially when security is lacking, 
society is less receptive, and politicians are divided. The revolution of January 2011 was 
about “bread, freedom, and dignity” for Egyptians, as stated by the protestors. Economic 
reform would be a decision that would leave more dissatisfied Egyptians. Improving the 
economy was not a shortfall of Morsi’s government only. The resignation of the interim 
government of Bablawi, which took over after President Morsi, was proof of the 
socioeconomic constraint that continued to hamper the management of the Egyptian 
economic crisis. Despite the $12 billion financial aid from Gulf countries, the 
unemployment rate stayed around 13 percent, fiscal deficit reached 14 percent of the 
GDP, and the Egyptian pound lost 12 percent to the U.S. dollar.73 The discussion here 
concerns the timing of implementing such reform, especially when the majority of the 
populace belongs to the lower class. Any rise in prices and elimination of subsidies will 
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only anger them and push them back to the street. The middle-class that most of a new 
regime could rely on to gain legitimacy is marginalized in Egypt. Egypt’s experience 
with economic liberalization or infitah damaged the country’s social structure, and 
brought more inequality and poverty than wealth to the country because of the lack of 
strategy from the old regime to pursue social and economic development rather than 
relative economic growth. Currently, most Egyptians are afraid of any further 
liberalization and extra-debt that could benefit only a small number of people and create 
hardship on the rest.  
 CONCLUSION C.
Modernization theory is applicable to the case of Egypt’s transition to democracy. 
Egypt was not ripe for democracy under the MB regime and will still not be ready in the 
coming years because of the economic crisis, widespread corruption, income inequality, 
and lack of a middle-class. Absence of security and stability in Egypt, lack of fiscal and 
monetary reforms, and the involvement of the military in the economy hindered Morsi’s 
government from making decisions to alleviate the larger population’s economic 
grievances. The widespread corruption and the interconnection of the business class to 
the state inhibited the business class from effectively promoting a healthy civil society, 
which is a pre-condition for a transition to democracy. The degradation and hardship 
experienced by the middle class affected its ability to commit to social development 
through effective political participation. While economic growth contributes to the 
endurance of democracy, the socioeconomic crisis in Egypt, in these last years, hindered 
the transition to democracy. In order to promote tourism, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and lower the unemployment rate and poverty, Egypt will need to promote security and 
social and political stability as well as contain corruption. Fixing the budget deficit and 
gaining access to international financial aid will require fiscal reform. Egypt will be able 
to prosper economically and observe economic growth, but economic growth in Egypt is 
not expected without a compromise between the government and political parties. 
Finally, Egypt should balance its priorities between economic growth and economic 
development, and avoid its previous mistakes of unsustainable growth that could lead to 
the worsening of unemployment, social inequality, and poverty. 
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III. FAILURE OF POLITICAL ACTORS TO FORM A PACT 
 POLITICALACTORS APPROACH A.
According to Huntington, Rustow, and Przeworski, the elites in a society 
constitute the most critical factor for transition from an authoritarian to a democratic 
regime; their support and commitment to democracy is the key to either a smooth, short 
transition or a bumpy, lengthy one. However, their resistance to change will lead to 
falling back to the old regime or to a failed state. The political actors approach 
emphasizes the importance of the elites’ commitment to democracy as the driver for 
success. While economic development is likely to drive democracy, political leaders are a 
“must” to make it happen.74 During the transition to democracy, these actors will run into 
conflicts of interest, but they have to stay united against the authoritarian regime and 
remain committed to democracy in order to succeed. Dankart Rustow in Transition to 
Democracy stated that democracy is a long process of “inclusive political struggle.”75  
In order to transition from an authoritarian regime, a democratic regime has to go 
through two different phases: extrication from the authoritarian regime and crafting a 
democratic constitution.76 In the first phase, extrication is reached only when most of the 
participants in the transition will guarantee democracy and enjoy benefits from it. 
Without a guarantee, reformers within the authoritarian bloc will prefer the “status quo” 
and ally themselves with the hardliners. Extrication is feasible only with negotiation and 
trust among the elites, mainly moderates and reformers. On one hand, reformers will 
offer some assurance to ease hardliners and recruit many of them to join their ranks. On 
the other hand, moderates will guarantee that they have nothing to fear from democracy. 
Informal agreements on sharing power and office, forming a political pact against 
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intruders, and consensus on a road map for moving the country toward democracy are the 
ingredients for a successful extrication from an old regime. On the road map, political 
actors lay down the timing of elections and the crafting of the constitution, as well as 
their sequences, so all actors will have less to complain about the process. Political pacts 
among the leaders of political parties will agree on dividing the power and government 
offices among themselves, agree on basic policy orientations, and exclude outsiders.77 
Such pacts used in Italy, Spain, and Uruguay, and were called “transformismo.” The 
Venezuelan 1958 pact “Punto Fijo” was successful in establishing a democratic rotation 
in government office. In this pact, three pro-democratic political parties agreed on 
dividing government posts among themselves and excluded communists from 
participation.78 
The second phase of transition in the political actors approach is constitution 
crafting. Like extrication, representatives of pro-democratic forces enter into negotiations 
about writing a constitution that supports the emergence of democratic institutions, 
replacing the previous authoritarian ones. One key to success in this phase is compromise 
among all political actors on the decisions that should be made by agreement and the 
decisions that are left for competition, as well as the means that should be implemented to 
prevent society from subverting the emerging democratic regime. The Spanish 
constitution of 1977 specified only the rules of the game and left everything else to 
competition. On the other hand, the Brazilian constitution of 1988 was achieved based on 
agreement among actors, which specified everything including social and economic 
rights.79 
Moreover, political leaders struggling to overcome remnants of an authoritarian 
regime should consider when to divide and compete while still staying united against the 
old regime. If political actors divide early, they may risk the democratic transition as 
incumbents of the authoritarian regime take advantage of this division and play the actors 
one against the other. The rivalry between two anti-authoritarian regime presidential 
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candidates in South Korea resulted in their both losing in the presidential elections and 
opened the way to a new candidate tied to the old regime.80 However, if pro-democratic 
actors choose not to divide at all, this may lead to a regime that is more an anti-
authoritarian regime than a democratic one and which would lack competition and 
representation.81 
In summary, a successful transition is the result of a negotiated extrication and 
generating a negotiated constitution among political actors. Pro-democratic actors will 
chose either to eliminate or repress those who resist transformation by introducing 
democratic institutions and any means that they can pursue to carry out their political 
struggle. Pro-democratic actors may choose to include some of the old regime by 
providing them with some political and economic opportunities for their quiescence. 
Either strategy requires that political actors form a political pact, provide guarantees and 
benefits to all participants, and negotiate the rules of transition. 
 POLITICAL ACTORS B.
The second chapter of this thesis argues that, in Egypt, failure of political leaders 
to find a middle ground and settle their differences under Morsi’s government led to the 
failure of the democratic transition. After the January 2011 revolution, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was caught between conflicting political forces with the Salafis, on one 
hand, and the secularists, on the other.82 This political polarization challenged the MB to 
reach a compromise and raised an issue of incompatibility between Islam and democracy, 
despite President Morsi’s discourse of commitment to democracy soon after his election 
as the head of the state. Many political actors quickly lost trust in the MB after the group 
overreached for power and became exclusive when Morsi won the presidential election, 
despite the MB’s promises not to run a candidate.83 This chapter will address the 
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relationship between key political stakeholders and the MB, and how they failed to both 
extricate the state from an authoritarian regime and craft a constitution. This chapter 
outlines the MB’s intentions and commitment to democracy, and how each political actor 
perceived the MB and Morsi’s government. Key stakeholders were: the military, 
Salafists, secularists, and Christian Copts. The MB’s relationship to the military will be 
addressed in more depth in Chapter IV.  
1. The MB’s Relationship with its Opponents and Commitment to 
Democracy 
The MB’s credibility as a democratic actor is still debatable, especially after its 
failure to transition Egypt to democracy under its rule. The MB adapted to its political 
environment by establishing political legitimacy after the overthrow of Mubarak. Despite 
the challenges that this new political party faced, to separate its religious ideology from 
politics, it demonstrated flexibility to compromise and embraced democracy.84 Taking a 
close look, the MB was the most vocal advocate for democracy under the leadership of 
Tilemensani.  Tilemensani realized that representation in parliament was an ideal way to 
gain political legitimacy without provoking Sadat’s regime.85 Since that time, the MB 
started competing for leadership positions; its leaders succeeded in winning in 
professional syndicates and student organizations.86 The MB promoted social justice, 
religious tolerance and political plurality, trying to challenge Mubarak’s regime on its 
democratic credentials. Through the professional syndicates and student organizations, 
the MB emphasized democratic values promoting inclusiveness regardless of race, 
religion, or ethnicity.87 In “Islam in Politics and Power,” Hudaibi addressed the MB’s 
political views on different issues such as political pluralism, violence, and relationships 
between Muslim and non-Muslims.88 The fifteen principles of the MB are in accordance 
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with democratic principles that promote human rights, civil society, political competition, 
and civil-military relations.89 
There is no doubt about the emergence of the MB from its inception as a radical 
organization to a moderate democratic Islamic organization during the last two decades. 
The problem that the MB faced after the ousting of Mubarak was to transform from a 
competing organization to a ruling political power and implementing its democratic 
principles.90 This problem became a challenge when the MB came face to face with a 
political scene with a long history of authoritarian institutions such as the military and 
security forces. “Since Morsi won, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted more of a 
conciliatory tone and made an effort to reach out to non-Islamists,” Mr. Hamid said, “The 
question is if it has worked, and I would say it hasn’t. It’s deep-seated. Neither side trusts 
the other.”91 Secularists accused President Morsi for allying with the military and 
accommodating their demands, rather than subduing them to civilian control. The MB 
overreached for power and was not willing to share it and wanted to transform Egypt into 
an Islamic state. Morsi did little to stop security forces from suppressing demonstrators, 
and he undermined the judiciary in order to amass maximum power.  
All of these accusations led to a division between Islamists and non-Islamists, 
initially, and then, contributed to the Salafists dissociation from the MB. However, these 
were not the sole factors that blocked the transition to democracy. Inability to form a pact 
against a previous authoritarian regime, inability to compromise and compete 
democratically and failure to address a road map for transition were the factors that 
contributed to a division among political actors, which then led to the military 
intervention. 
Shortly after toppling Mubarak’s regime, all of the political participants in the 
revolution underestimated the effectiveness of the “deep state” and its determination to 
come back to claim what it had lost. In this context, the deep state was a coalition of 
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influential and anti-democratic groups of high ranking military and security officers and 
judges. Whether or not the MB behaviors pushed its opponents to divide early, it was a 
bad strategy. While overthrowing Mubarak was an achievement in itself, Mubarak’s 
regime would carry on unless authoritarian institutions were also removed. This could 
have been accomplished only with a political pact, in which all actors set aside their 
differences and behaved democratically. The fragmentation among Islamists and non-
Islamist actors caused a failure to agree on a road map and build a pact against the 
military, which in turn provided the latter with a chance to intervene and dictate its rules 
for transition. In an atmosphere of mistrust among political actors, combined with social 
unrest, the military emerged as the only institution that could save Egypt.92 Henceforth, 
the military unilaterally implemented a road map for transition, set the date for elections, 
and dictated the requirements for the constitution drafting, which created conflicts among 
political participants. 
The division among political parties had become very apparent earlier, after the 
presidential and parliamentary elections. For democracy to work, political parties need to 
divide and compete, unlike during the Mubarak era, when political parties functioned to 
support the regime rather than confront it. However, the early split led to a third party 
intervening in the transition to democracy. 
It was clear from the beginning that after the overthrow of Mubarak’s regime, the 
opposition appeared disconnected and lacked a good plan for transition. With the absence 
of a consensual road map, the Egyptian generals stepped up to make all of the decisions 
for the transition and played all of the political actors against one another.  It was a 
strategy that the generals pursued to make the opponents feel weak and then rely on the 
military to guarantee some political power in this transition. Therefore, with failure to 
compromise on a road map and democratic rules of the game that required all political 
parties to follow, the MB sided with the military for obvious reasons—to restore security 
and then to avoid any conflict of interest, building trust between the strongest institutions 
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in Egypt.93 This early deal between the MB and Security Council of Armed Forces 
(SCAF) led by Field Marshal Tantawi was considered by the political opponents as an 
agreement to divide power between them and leave others out. The Islamists would 
control the legislative branch, whereas the military would maintain its control over the 
executive branch by delegation.94 However, approaching the presidential elections this 
conspiracy proved not valid as the MB showed interest in the presidential election. 
The only two forces that were able to compete in this political vacuum were the 
military and the MB. The quiet time enjoyed after Mubarak’s overthrow came to an end, 
as the two groups proved they could not coexist in harmony. The long history of rivalry 
that these two shared since Nassir’s era could not be ignored. The military could not trust 
the MB and jeopardize its economic and political interests, especially if it was aware of 
the Islamists’ commitment to get rid of corruption and any symbols connected to the old 
regime. Even though the MB provided assurance to the military and sought its support in 
this early transition, it was only a matter of time before the MB subdues the military 
under its control. On the other hand, the MB’s suspicion toward the military grew when 
the latter backed the career army officer and former vice president, Omar Suleiman, in 
the coming presidential election.95 This move was seen by the MB as an attempt to 
restore the old regime.  
The MB was divided on whether to appoint one of its members for the coming 
presidential election on May 2012. Such a decision would put the MB in a bitter 
confrontation with the SCAF as claimed by Ayman al-Sayyid, but the situation was 
different from what the MB first agreed on.96 Initially, the MB declared that it was not 
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going to compete for the presidential election; however, it backed away from its promise 
once the old regime announced its candidate, which was supported by the generals. 97 
In addition to the mistrust between the MB and its opponents because of the 
presidential election, now more than before, the opponents believed that the Islamists had 
“hijacked” the revolution since they were the last to join and finished by usurping all the 
power. Early on after Mubarak stepped down, the Islamists allied with other secular 
parties and showed a willingness to share power, and promised they were not going to be 
greedy. Their near term objective was to be represented in parliament. But once they 
dominated the parliament, taking almost 70% of the seats, they pushed their political 
agenda even though it was at the expense of minorities. When Morsi won the election to 
become the first civilian president, this ambiguity about Islamists and “Islamocracy” 
became a nightmare for most seculars, liberals, and Christian Copts.98 At this point, the 
Islamists, who were banned from politics, became the dominant power. On the other 
hand, the military, secularists, and liberals lost everything. They faced possibly losing 
their economic advantages, while the Copts feared losing their religious freedoms. The 
situation became intense and trust between Islamists and non-Islamists was marginalized, 
especially after Khairat al-Shater, the former deputy leader of the MB, announced during 
an interview with Reuters that his acceptance to run for the presidency was to provide the 
MB dominated parliament the executive power to allow for reforms without military 
meddling.99 Also, he added that the new government would establish civilian control 
over the military as well as taking away its economic prerogatives.100 Shater said, 
“Egypt’s new government would exercise civilian oversight over the armed forces’ 
budget and their business interests.”101 While this claim was a direct attack on the 
military, Shater also addressed the Islamist intentions to reform society on the basis of 
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Islamic values, “Our foremost aim is achieving progress based on Islamic principles.”102 
These are claims that could not be ignored by either the military or other non-Islamist 
groups. 
The MB made great ideological compromises when they gave up the idea of 
establishing an Islamic state and built alliances with other political parties, but they were 
rejected in every attempt to accommodate their opponents. Many members of the MB 
believed that the non-Islamists were the issue, not MB governance; a member of the MB 
said, “It is clear that the Islamists are not welcome in all cases, and the accepted and 
required democracy cannot be ushered by the Islamist trend unless it abandons its identity 
and roots.”103 The only solution was to confront their opponents. As a backup to this 
claim, in 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the majority of seats in local 
elections and in the National Assembly in Algeria, it was confronted by the Army when it 
canceled the second round of the elections.104 
Those who joined Tamorrod during June 2013 were convinced that the Islamists 
failed to prove that they were committed to democracy and that they had not really 
changed throughout the last decades. In one year of rule, the MB proved that they were 
unable to share power and tolerate liberal democracy. The one-year rule of the MB 
provided evidence to all Egyptians that its blame of the old regimes for the way the 
brothers had been treated was deserved. In the past, every time an MB member was 
arrested or prosecuted by the old regimes, the “mihna” was mentioned and the MB 
became the victims.105 Most Egyptians sympathized with their cause, and believed that 
they had been discriminated against. They were labeled terrorists and used as scapegoats 
in order to eliminate the Brothers from the political arena.  
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Egyptians are convinced now of the failure of the MB to govern and respect 
others’ civil and religious rights. This time the MB persecution came from all Egyptians, 
society in general and politicians, calling for its overthrow, rather than from the authority 
as during the times of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak.106 During one year of governance, the 
MB and Morsi’s government endured many criticisms and failed to reach a compromise 
with political parties or civil society. They were called undemocratic and power grabbers. 
The MB tried to contain the military’s power, limit secularists from exerting any political 
influence, threaten Christian Copts’ safety, and tried to manipulate the judiciary branch.  
A close examination into the MB’s conduct reveals that the MB’s opponents 
exaggerated their accusations. The MB’s actions indicated that it tried to accommodate 
and reach out to its opponents. The MB’s good intention to compromise and be open to 
political pluralism was shown in its formation of a Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), a 
separate political party from the parent organization. The FJP accounted for 9,100 
members of whom a third were Copts and non-Brotherhood members.107 This was an 
indication of the MB’s willingness to share power and provide inclusiveness. The 
organization asked its members who held key positions at the FJP to leave the MB. Also, 
Morsi disassociated himself from FJP once he became president, claiming that he was a 
president for all Egyptians.108 The claim that the MB was exclusive once they reached 
power is not conclusive. 
In August 2012, two months after his election, President Morsi sent into 
retirement the army’s head and defense minister, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, and 
replaced him with General Abd el-Fattah el-Sisi. He also pushed many other senior 
generals into retirement, and canceled military laws intended to restrict presidential 
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powers.109 This move was received enthusiastically by Egyptians who, for years called on 
limiting the political influence of the military. However, it was still a bold move for a 
newly elected president to have targeted the head of the country’s strongest institution. Al 
Jazeera’s Rawya Rageh called Morsi’s decision a “political earthquake.”110 Many 
observers regarded this unexpected decision as Morsi’s tactic to consolidate his own 
power and reform the military in a way to serve the MB regime. According to Robert 
Springborg, “It’s a takeover of military rule rather than the end of military rule. This is 
another phase of authoritarian rule.”111 The decision to send the military back to the 
barracks and submit it to civilian control was a part of the transition to democracy. 
However, the decision was taken unilaterally and involved neither the military nor other 
political parties. The decision could have been interpreted as a move by the MB as a 
projection of power. The military has had a history with the MB since 1952, and it could 
retaliate. A compromise among all key leaders on how and when a transition to civilian 
control over the military would be best implemented would signal the good intentions of 
the MB, and that would not have been overreaching for power. Such a decision is a step 
toward consolidation of democracy. Moreover, the support of the other political actors 
would have shown the military that the society was united and committed to democracy. 
Regarding the crafting of the constitution, most debate and the division among the 
actors concerned the dominance of Islamists in the government and how that could lead 
to the establishment of an Islamocracy. Comparing the new 2013 constitution to the 2012 
constitution, they are very similar. The similarity between the two constitutions proved 
that the problem was who wrote the constitution rather than what was in the 
constitution.112 “A similar formulation in the 2012 constitution was condemned by the 
people in power now—suggesting that in the end what counts in Egypt is not what the 
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constitution says but who wrote it,” Marina Ottaway said.113 Also, while President Morsi 
was criticized for keeping the military’s interests intact, the opposition let the military 
have more influence after the overthrow of President Morsi. The new constitution 
allowed the military to try civilians in military courts, and the defense minister must be a 
military officer chosen by the SCAF.114 
The MB tried to compromise and sympathized with both the Salafists and 
secularists, but the latter decided to cut short the process of negotiation and boycotted the 
constitutional assembly. “When boycotts,” Brown claimed, “and questioning of election 
results become the stuff of normal politics there is little room for give-and-take.”115 
Moreover, non-Islamist political ineffectiveness made it harder for the MB and Morsi’s 
government to keep moving forward in this transition. First, when non-Islamists protested 
the idea that the constitution should precede the elections, they failed to provide an 
alternative plan on how and who should craft the constitution.116 Then, they boycotted 
the constitutional assembly and used the courts and the military to solve their 
disagreement with the MB, instead of keeping negotiations open and articulating their 
vision about the constitution.117 According to the Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, the 
opposition was more threatening than negotiating in its dialogue with the MB because of 
the opposition’s confidence in its leaders recently, the media, and the Salafists joining the 
opposition.118 
2. Split between the MB and Secularists 
From the time of Sadat, political tolerance and pluralism were not intended to 
compete in the regime. Multiple-party tolerance was designed to strengthen the 
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authoritarian system and contain the revolutionary elites. This is the recipe for enduring 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.119 Sadat created the National Progressive 
Unionist Party (NPUP-Tagamuu) and the Liberal party (LP) as socialist parties and 
encouraged some of his supporters to join them.120 They did not naturally emerge as 
competitors to the Sadat’s regime or as a representation of the fabric of Egyptian society. 
Tagamuu’s objective was to marginalize any leftist party, such as the Nasserites, and 
absorb them. The National Democratic Party, or Mubarak’s Party, represented only the 
elites who wished to connect to the state and further their interests; it was designed for 
“indoctrination, surveillance, and repression.”121 According to Alaa al-Din Arafat, these 
new parties were mirrors of the president and his regime.122 Henceforth, after decades of 
authoritarian regimes, secularists were left without a clear vision, social support, or skills 
of political negotiation. 
Not long after the departure of Mubarak, Islamists and secular actors disagreed 
about the sequence and procedure of elections and about writing the constitution. The 
debate was about whether the elections should precede the writing of the constitution or 
not.123 The Islamists called for elections before the constitution because they seemed to 
be the most organized and favored to win. The secularists demanded not to rush to 
elections until a constitution was written and they would profit from the time to organize 
their campaigns. Without a compromise, the military capitalized on this disagreement to 
push its agenda and its rules regarding the democratic transition.124 Nonetheless, an early 
disagreement and rush to elections resulted in a rejection of the outcome by secularists 
who opposed the early elections. The democratic path started poorly when the military 
gave ambiguous directives on the writing of the constitution. It failed to determine who 
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the hundred representatives to write the constitution would be.125 Hence, most of the 
representatives were pulled from parliament, which was dominated by Islamists; this 
gave more reasons to secularists to boycott the drafting of the constitution because the 
constitution would not represent all of Egyptian society.126 
The friction between the MB and secular parties increased when the MB decided 
to participate in the presidential elections. Secular parties viewed this decision as a 
strategy by the MB to monopolize power and control all leadership positions, especially 
after the Islamists dominated the parliament. The former foreign minister and Arab 
League leader, Amr Moussa, declared that a win in the presidential elections and a 
domination of the parliament by Islamists would undermine non-Islamists and make it 
seem that “the revolution had never happened.”127 Like Amr Moussa, many of the 
opponents of the MB believed that the revolution was championed by liberals who now 
found themselves on the side and in a situation that was worse than before the revolution.  
While Morsi’s decision to establish oversight on the military was popular, many 
other political actors were not supportive of the move. The Al-Wafd party which was 
against the MB’s run for presidency, criticized Morsi’s decision to contain military 
power, claiming it was evidence of the MB’s intention to control Egypt.128 Nasserist and 
the Democratic Front Parties called the move a coup by the Brotherhood on the state.129 
On the other hand, while Mohammed ElBaradei, leader of the liberal movement, 
approved of the move against the military, he warned that such recovery of executive and 
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legislative power should be temporary; otherwise, it would be considered to be against 
democratic principles.130  
Over time secularists became more outspoken toward President Morsi’s policies 
than before, and they refused to collaborate in the constitutional process, preferring to 
protest on the street instead. Under this pretext, President Morsi issued a presidential 
decree giving him power to challenge any laws and neutralize the judiciary until the 
approval of the constitution. In defense of his presidential decree, President Morsi 
claimed that the decree was temporary, and that it was necessary for Egypt to pass this 
transitional period and restore stability which the country was lacking because of the 
absence of a constitution.131 While President Morsi’s intention was to maintain 
sovereignty, secularists responded that sovereignty was a matter of national security and 
foreign policy, and not to grant the president immunity from legal challenges.132  
3. Split between the MB and Salafi Al Nour Party 
Early in the Egyptian revolution and after the overthrow of Mubarak, many 
observers predicted that the MB and Salafist alliance was mainly to undermine secularists 
and liberals, and would not last long. It took only a few months for this alliance to come 
to an end, and then the groups became rivals.133 To understand this rivalry, the ideologies 
of these two organizations must be understood. Salafism is a movement that emphasizes 
close devotion to the model of the Salaf or “predecessors.”134 Salafist ideology and 
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practice of Islam is a direct imitation of the practices of Islam by the first generation of 
Islam, especially the practices and teaching of the Prophet Muhammad—that the Quran 
and Sunna are the core of the Islamic faith and practice.  According to Jonathan Brown, 
before the revolution the Salafis were not politically active, due to their belief in no 
separation between religion and politics.135 Moreover, they advocated political quietism, 
“Muslims must not rebel against their ruler no matter how unjust or impious he is, and 
the Muslim masses have no rights to political participation,” Brown said.136 Under this 
pretext Mubarak became more tolerant to Salafis and used them to balance the MB. Like 
the Salafis, the MB extracts its ideology from the Quran and the Sunna. The MB 
assimilated some modern Western ideas and showed more willingness to compromise 
with secularists.137 In contrast, the Salafis opposed modernity. The MB accepts modern 
science and recruits professionals and intellectuals educated in the West—it incorporates 
the Western idea of revolution and democracy with a different interpretation and 
reference to Sharia.138 In his interpretation of Sharia law, President Morsi drew many 
similarities between Shura or consultation and Western democracy, such as women’s 
rights, freedom of speech, and protection of religious minorities.139 In view of these 
ideological differences, the cooperation between the MB and Salafis came to an end. The 
differences resulted in confrontations between the MB and Salafis beginning in the 
1970’s when each of the groups tried to dominate the public domain, mainly through 
mosques and universities.140 
Early in the revolution, the MB and Salafis had formed an alliance to leverage 
their resources and counter-balance the secular and liberal parties. Also, they thought 
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they could work together for a common cause. However, after winning 72% of the seats 
in the 2011 People’s Assembly elections, the alliance with the Salafis was deemed to 
present challenges to the MB. While, the MB tried to sooth the fears of liberals about 
domination by Islamists by emphasizing tolerance and pluralism, the Salafis 
demonstrated transparency by implementing Islamic rules regarding “banking, alcohol, 
and women’s dress or entertainment.”141 The MB was aware that the rise of the Salafis to 
power would alarm many secularists and Christian Copts. The friction between the two 
groups escalated when President Morsi dismissed one of his advisors from the Nour 
Party, Khaled Alam Eldin, after allegation of abusing his power in office.142 This 
incident was only one indication of the bitter struggle for power between the MB and the 
Salafists, in which each group tried to amass the maximum power in the absence of 
political competition. 
While many non-Islamist parties renounced political participation, the Salafists 
comprised the only political body left to check the MB’s overreach for power. The 
Salafists took this opportunity to further their demand for drafting the constitution to 
reflect their vision of the Islamic state, particularly through Article 2, which states, 
“Principles of Islamic law are the main source of legislation.”143 Salafists sought to 
change the wording of “principles” to “rulings,” which became a point of friction 
between Islamists and non-Islamists and made difficult the position of the MB as 
mediator between the ultraconservative Salafis and non-Islamist opponents. According to 
Khalil Anani, an expert on Islamist movements, “Islamists are conservative in 
revolutionary times, exclusionary when it comes to collaboration, and authoritarian in the 
face of democracy.”144 
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The Salafists resented the way that the MB treated them and tried to contain them 
from reaching for more power. The MB wanted the Salafists to take its side regardless of 
their vision, disregarding their own power aspirations, “We hate being followers,” the 
Salafi al Nour party said.145 The MB used the Salafists to survive the pressure of 
unsatisfied Egyptians protesting on the streets and demanding the overthrow of President 
Morsi. The common cause alliance that brought the two groups together came to an end 
when the al-Nour party joined secularists to ally with the National Salvation Front. 
This crisis between the MB and the Salafists projects a new perspective on the 
two Islamic groups regarding their political strategies, and their unwillingness to 
strengthen their alliance. It was neither religion nor ideology that separated them; rather, 
it was their both overreaching for power that ended up dividing them.146 If their main 
concern was about ideology, then it would have been more logical for the Salafists to 
stick with the MB and trade its support for some consensus about implementing Sharia 
law. The Salafists realized that they could further their influence and achieve extra 
political power by eliminating the MB. During that time the MB was dealing with the 
Salafists from a weak position. Yielding to Salafists would only give non-Islamists 
another reason not to collaborate with the MB. In both cases, the MB satisfied neither the 
Salafists nor non-Islamists.147 
4. Discrimination against Coptic Christians 
Over many years Coptic Christians had expressed their concerns about 
discrimination and the Egyptian government’s failure to guarantee their rights as equal 
citizens. Therefore, Coptic Christians participated in the January 2011 revolution and the 
protests in June 2013, which resulted in ending both Mubarak and Morsi’s regimes. Early 
in the January 2011 revolution, Egyptian Copts saw an opportunity to make a change to 
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social inequality and the mistreatment of Copts by integrating Coptic political members 
into the ranks of the FJP. Early in the transition, the formation of the FJP sent a message 
of the MB’s ability to be inclusive and sympathetic toward its rivals, as well as its 
commitment to democracy. As Islamists dominated the parliamentary and presidential 
elections, the Copts became worried that Egypt would turn into an Islamic state similar to 
Iran, in which religious minority rights would be disregarded, even after Morsi met with 
many of Egypt’s church leaders assuring their safety under the MB regime.148 Morsi 
claimed his intention to serve as a “president to all Egyptians,” regardless of religious and 
political orientation.149 Christian Copts mainly feared the influence of the Salafis to 
implement strict Sharia law that would lower Christians, as well as other religious 
minorities, to second and third class Egyptian citizens. Like the secularists’, the Christian 
debate was about the constituent assembly and the alteration of article 2 of the 
constitution, which would lead to further division of the Egyptian society.150 The issue of 
discrimination and attacks against Coptic Christians was not new during the 18 months of 
the MB rule, but the attacks on their persons, properties, and sanctuaries only escalated. 
Also, Copts continued to be underrepresented in key government and security 
positions.151 
One month before Morsi’s overthrow by the military, Coptic Christians reported 
at least six attacks on churches and Coptic buildings in Aswan, Beni Suef, Cairo, and 
Fayoum.  The government failed to take any action or initiate any investigations in order 
to halt these attacks against the Coptic community.152 From fear of the escalation of 
oppression by Islamists, many Coptic Christians made plans to emigrate. The situation 
worsened between Morsi’s government and the Coptic community when the Netherlands 
responded to the Coptic struggle and offered to provide political asylum to Egyptian 
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Copts.153 Finally, when the Christian Copts joined the June 2013 revolution to oust 
President Morsi, they came to a consensus that neither Morsi nor any Islamist leader 
would help the cause of Christian Copts or maintain harmony among those of the various 
Egyptian religious and cultural backgrounds. President Morsi failed to commit to his 
promises to the Christian Copts and name a Christian as one of his vice presidents when 
he won the election. Youssef Hamza said, “His cabinet includes a single Christian, a 
woman and his only Christian adviser has quit the panel tasked with drafting a new 
constitution in protest over Islamist domination of the process.”154 
The issue between Egyptian Muslims and the Coptic minority is a reoccurring 
struggle that will not end until the government takes an assertive measure in dealing with 
sectarian conflicts. The government failed to address the root cause of the sectarian 
conflicts by following the traditional method of reconciliation and compensation for the 
victims without condemning the perpetrator, “the authority must go beyond rhetoric and 
political score-settling…investigations into the violence must be thorough impartial and 
independent,” Youssef Sidhoum, expert in Coptic affairs, said. 155 Many Coptic 
Christians see the issue evident in the substance of the constitution, which puts Muslims 
and Islam above other religions and religious minorities. If the constitution addressed and 
guaranteed equality to all Egyptians, the religious discrimination would be irrelevant 
regardless of who was in power. 
 CONCLUSION C.
From the beginning, major political actors of the Egyptian transition to democracy 
failed to compromise and form a political pact. Instead, they fell into the trap of mistrust 
and paved the way for the military to set the rules allowing it to gain its confidence and 
emerge as the only “savior” of Egypt. The timing of the parliamentary elections, the 
presidential election, and the drafting of the constitution were not the issues that divided 
the political parties and Egyptian society; rather, it was the lack of a broad consensus 
                                                 




among the elites on the rules of transition and clear procedures to allow the Egyptian 
people to express their demands that led to the failure of Egypt to establish a democracy. 
It is true that the MB gained enough power and should have shared some with the other 
political parties and that President Morsi over-reached for power and ruled by decree. 
However, oppositionists neither provided an alternative plan for transition nor articulated 
their own vision about the constitution’s substance.156 Instead, they complained and 
boycotted the drafting of the constitution. Decades of authoritarian regimes left non-
Islamists without a clear vision or alternative to overcome their discontent. They cheered 
the military and reached out to the courts to settle their issues, leaving no room for 
political competition. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON  
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
 AN OVERVIEW A.
It is only within the last two decades that political scientists have begun paying 
close attention to the external factors affecting developing democracies—before then, 
they emphasized domestic factors as the drivers to democracy.157 The international 
approach emphasizes the presence of global and regional democratic powers, economic 
interdependence, and how international organizations could contribute to a smooth 
democratic transition.158 There are two methods of international influence: leverage and 
linkage. Leverage is when a state uses its power to encourage or discourage another state 
during its democratic transition. Linkage is when a political movement is tied to the 
particular ideas and institutions of another state.159 
Individual states could intervene in a democratic transition by imposing 
conditions called “democratic conditionality.”160 This intervention involves persuasion of 
a particular country by granting it tangible or intangible benefits to protect democracy, 
such as financial support, trade or market access, security guarantees, and membership in 
desirable organizations. Also, this conditionality includes the threat of sanctions, such as 
withholding some benefits the government enjoys. Conditionality practice is the newest 
weapon employed by external forces and occurs when the international community can 
impose conditions directly on a government. Based on the cost-benefit of the reward or 
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sanction, ideally the targeted government will change its position and comply with the 
international community—this is the top-down approach. The bottom up approach is 
when the international community empowers domestic actors and by-passes the existing 
government. By doing so, international influence shifts the domestic political power in 
favor of reformists by strengthening their bargaining power.161 The cost-benefit that a 
state must factor to weigh the consequences of its actions are shaped by: 
1. the size of its adoption/compliance costs in the domestic system 
2. the size and speed of rewards (or punishments) 
3. the credibility of threats and promises 
4. the determinacy of the conditions imposed162 
In the case of Portugal’s democratic transition, European countries provided 
economic incentives during its transition and promised it a membership in the European 
Community (EC) if democracy were consolidated.163 Also, many of the successful 
democratic transitions in sub-Saharan Africa were influenced by economic sanctions.  
Beyond the role of the international community in imposing or inhibiting 
democratic change, linkage between international agents and domestic actors is another 
form of external influence. States are connected to each other through economic, 
geopolitical, and social ties, as well as transnational civil society associations.164 The 
stronger the ties between a country and democratic external actors are, the better its 
chance of democratic development is.165 Inversely, weak economic, political, 
institutional, and social ties with democratic states will hamper a country’s democratic 
change. This concept of linkages allows the integration of newly democratic states into 
the regional/global political, economic, and security community. For instance, economic 
and political ties between Eastern and Western European states allowed many of the 
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Eastern European states to enter the European Union (EU), NATO, and Council of 
Europe.166 While integration by democratic states fosters democracy, integration by anti-
democratic states prevents democratization. In many countries, because of their locations, 
political, economic, social, and security ties with authoritarian states prevent them risking 
developed ties to switch regimes. 
International socialization is another form of linkage and external influence 
supported by the constructive theorists. While the incentives of leverage, economic 
interdependence, and ties with transnational organizations are focused on material 
factors, socialization emphasizes the role of ideas and identities in developing democratic 
behaviors within a society. The ideational factor can have deeper effects on state more 
than materialistic power. Once a society begins to embrace democratic ideas and its 
identity supports democratic norms, democracy is more likely to be embraced and 
succeed. Society sympathizes with honest brokers of democracy. The way democratic 
actors perceive external actors could motivate or discourage democratic transition. This 
point is crucial. If the former is seen as “one of us” and a legitimate actor, the idea of 
democracy will be more receptive to the local government. This implies that actors react 
to the interests of and adopt the identity of communities that they see themselves close to. 
Similarly, the cultural and geographical proximity to a democratic community also 
inspires countries to evolve toward democracy more easily than countries neighboring 
autocratic communities.  
For countries in proximity to an autocratic community, external incentives will 
probably not be enough. In these cases, international actors have to engage in dialogue 
with the government and political parties, provide training and cultural exchange. These 
are some of the issues and challenges for a state that is new to democracy and 
geographically isolated from the democratic community. The challenge also arises when 
a neighboring country experiences a failed or uncertain transition. Hence, there will not 
be a model to import that can provide confidence of a successful transition. 
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Countries and international organizations use their leverages and linkages to 
influence and ensure the success of democratic transition. The geographical and cultural 
proximity to a democratic or an autocratic community may encourage or discourage the 
transition. 
 THE HOSTILITY OF THE GULF STATES TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN B.
EGYPT AND LIMITED SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY  
The social inequality and economic crisis that Egypt has experienced since 2008 
were, without a doubt, the most significant factors that mobilized Egyptians to demand 
the overthrow of Mubarak. Many observers emphasize the importance of international 
and regional communities’ involvement in promoting economic and social conditions in 
Egypt for a successful transition to democracy. However, in the case of Egypt, the 
international community fell short in its commitment to democracy. On one hand, the 
lack of security and compromise among political stakeholders impeded the U.S. and 
European Union from providing the necessary help for Egypt during this transition. This 
occurred alongside the rise of resentment toward the U.S., and the desire of Egyptians to 
distance themselves from outsiders. Mubarak’s foreign policy served the U.S.’s interests 
in the region but left bitter sentiments among Egyptians toward Westerners. On the other 
hand, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states opposed democracy and demonstrated 
their counter-revolutionary abilities to contain the spread of democracy. Under 
Mubarak’s rule, Egypt was the largest recipient of GCC financial assistance. Except for 
Qatar, the Gulf countries cut their assistance to Egypt once the MB came to power. Gulf 
financial aid resumed after the ousting of Morsi. 
This chapter analyzes how the limited support from the U.S. and the EU and how 
hostility of the Gulf States toward democracy created an environment unconducive to 
democracy within Egypt during the MB. The chapter is divided into two sections. The 
first section analyzes the relationship between the GCC states and Egypt after January 25, 
2011, and how the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Emiratis worked to sabotage the MB once they 
were convinced that their interests conflicted with those of the MB. The second section 
discusses how the U.S.’s shifted interests in the region limited support by the U.S. and 
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reduced its influence on Egypt’s military as well as on the GCC states to promote 
democracy in Egypt. 
1. The Hostility of the Gulf States toward Democracy 
On many fronts, the transition to democracy for the Middle East, especially 
Egypt, may have been more challenging than any other democratic transition in the 
world. In addition to the socioeconomic preconditions and lack of stakeholders’ 
commitment to democracy, the region faced the challenge of the Gulf monarchies’ 
resentment to democracy. The Gulf countries view democracy and the emergence of the 
Islamists’ new political powers as a threat to their monarchies. Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman clearly want to contain the spread of 
democracy. This becomes apparent when it is seen that the majority of the countries in 
the region either fail their transitions to democracy or have uncertain transitions. These 
failures concerned many Egyptians about the risk of economic stagnation or civil war. 
The examples of Syria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Yemen are the regional democratic 
experiences that Egyptians had of democracy. Even the example of Tunisia’s transition 
was unclear and failed to motivate Egyptians to push further toward democracy. This 
section of the thesis argues that pressure from the Gulf States and the regional 
experiences with democracy prevented the success of the democratic transition under the 
MB rule. 
With the exception of Qatar, the Gulf States saw the Arab Spring as a threat to the 
existence of their monarchies. On January 14, 2011, when Tunisia’s former President 
Ben Ali was forced to leave after social upheaval and two weeks of continuous protests, 
the Saudis provided a home for him and refused to surrender him to Tunisian authority. 
Once the protests in Egypt reached a tipping point, the Saudis supported Mubarak’s 
regime until the last minute and criticized the Obama administration for not backing up 
its strong allies. These reactions from Saudi Arabia were in line with the king’s intention 
to protect the al-Saud monarchy and its status-quo as the regional power. The reaction of 
Saudi Arabia to the mass demonstrations in Bahrain is another illustration of the 
relationship of regional monarchies to the Arab Spring. On March 14, 2011, the GCC 
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sent 1,500 military and police forces to Bahrain to quash the opposition there.167 Without 
Saudi intervention, King Khalifa of Bahrain would have been subject to the same fate as 
Mubarak and Ben Ali. 
The quasi-political liberalization in Bahrain and Kuwait presented political 
challenges for these two monarchies when they permitted parliamentarian elections. 
Bahrain experienced mass protests challenging the regime during the Arab Spring. The 
Sunni minority ruling monarchy was challenged by both the majority Shiites and Sunnis. 
In Kuwait, the challenge the monarchy faced was from the Sunnis; however, its politics 
were not yet polarized since the minority Shiites still supported the regime. In both 
countries, the demand of the protesters was to allow the parliaments to rule the country, 
not the ruling families. This political awakening became a dilemma facing the monarch 
rulers.168 A compromise allowing the elected parliaments to rule the country would 
create a conflict of interests requiring the ruling families to reduce their political power 
and jeopardize the existence of the monarchies entirely, “The initiation from both 
Bahraini and Kuwaiti rulers for political reforms on the table for discussion is an 
indication of the potential fate of Gulf monarchical reformers.”169 The Gulf States first 
responded to the challenge of the Arab Spring with oppression. Then they used their oil 
money to calm their unhappy citizens. Most GCC countries raised the salaries of their 
state employees, created new government jobs and welfare benefits, and some states, 
such as Kuwait, even distributed cash money to its citizens.170  
The Arab Spring was an illustration to the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, 
that the West and the U.S. are not reliable allies when their monarchies are in jeopardy, 
especially when challenges come from their own citizens. But, Arab monarchies can rely 
on each other for survivability. The intervention of GCC military forces in Bahrain is a 
good illustration, “outside allies cannot by themselves save a monarch, as the Shah of 
                                                 
167 Sean L. Yom and Gregory Gause, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang on,” Journal of 
Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012): 81.  
168 Gregory F. Gause, “Kings for all Seasons: How the Middle East’s Monarchies Survived the Arab 
Spring,” Brookings Doha Center Analysis, no. 8 (2013, September): 20. 
169 Ibid., 23. 
170 Ibid., 25. 
 59
Iran discovered,” Gause said.171 The events in 2011 provided enough incentive for the 
GCC to avoid Iran’s fate of 1979 to form an alliance against foreigners as well as their 
own citizens. Hence the GCC, with the lead of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE 
provided a $420 billion financial fund to their less economically prosperous monarchies 
and extended invitations to Morocco and Jordan to join the GCC.172 
The GCC states’ reactions to the Arab Spring are an illustration of the feared 
threat of democracy to their monarchies. They are concerned that Islamists in their own 
countries would be influenced by the political success achieved by Islamists in other 
Middle Eastern countries on one hand and that the MB would export its model to other 
GCC states, on the other hand. The success of the Salafi al-Nour Party in Egypt in 
parliamentary elections, winning almost 25 percent of the seats triggered questions 
among the Saudis about their own Salafi politicians. It is no longer inconceivable that the 
Saudi Salafis will demand a political role and become more critical of the ruling family. 
Before the 2011 Arab revolutions, the Salafis were not politically active and appeared 
satisfied with their da’wa and religious calls.173 Moreover, they advocated political 
quietism, prohibiting political participation and uprising against their rulers, regardless of 
how unjust they were.174 But the democracy supported by the Islamists, following the 
2011 revolutions, brought with it a new ideology and interpretation of the role of Salafis 
in the political arena. Even though Salafi Saudis are not yet involved in domestic politics, 
they have demonstrated their share of discontent toward the monarchy and have begun 
demanding political representation in a free elected parliament. The most important Salafi 
Saudi activist is Salman al-Awda, who supported the Egyptian uprising while the Saudi 
royals backed Mubarak. Al-Awda signed an online petition to elect a Saudi parliament in 
2011.175 This ideological shift among Salafis is a threat to the monarchies, especially the 
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al-Saud family, which has made Salafi Islam the official religion of the monarchy. In 
Kuwait, many of the opposition are Salafis.176 
In addition to the ideological shift and the challenges presented by the Salafis, the 
GCC states are threatened by the MB exporting its successful model to the rest of the 
region to possibly influence foreign policies that could shift the regional balance of 
power. The relationship between the MB and the GCC States was not warm from the 
beginning, especially when the Saudis criticized the U.S. for not supporting Mubarak and 
then sheltered many of his loyal followers. Under Mubarak, Saudi Arabia regarded Egypt 
as its strongest ally in the region, and a balance to the Iranian threat. The GCC states 
were not certain that President Morsi would maintain the same relationship as his 
predecessor. The GCC hoped that Morsi would honor the status quo policies of the region 
and would not interfere in the Gulf states’ internal affairs, that he would cooperate with 
the GCC regarding regional security, including supporting the GCC’s concern about the 
Iranian nuclear program.177 However, after the revolution, the Saudis had little 
confidence in Morsi’s intention to maintain Egypt’s commitment to the monarchies. At 
the beginning of the revolution Saudi Arabia and the UAE promised Egypt financial aid 
of $7.25 billion but only delivered $500 million before they became suspicious of the 
MB’s unclear intentions.178 The relationship between Egypt and the GCC states turned 
sour, and neither hid its resentment toward the other. Contrary to Mubarak, Morsi wanted 
to pursue diversified foreign policies that were different from his predecessor’s. Morsi 
wanted to restore Egypt’s regional power and influence, which had been lost during 
Mubarak’s time. He aimed to establish diversified economic relations with the whole 
region not only limited cooperation with the Gulf States. Morsi wanted to build a new 
economic relationship with Iran and strengthen the Turkish one. Moreover, Morsi 
believed the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran created instability and 
sectarian division. According to Paul Salem, Morsi believed that he could mediate 
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between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and that he could bring the “big four” countries in the 
region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt) to the table to settle their differences and 
end regional crises, such as the ones in Syria and Iraq.179 “Morsi is correct in proposing 
that Arab-Turkish-Iranian relations should be based on communication, negotiation, and 
attempted cooperation, not on continuous isolation and confrontation,” Salem said.180 
This rapprochement with Iran was interpreted by the Saudis as a warming to Iran 
and a threat to the GCC states. The GCC states began seeing the MB as a danger to the 
monarchies and the spread of its ideology as an intimidation to their regimes. With the 
exception of Qatar, the GCC states heightened their alerts toward the MB, especially after 
the Chief of Dubai Police, Lieutenant-General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim discovered a MB 
plot to overthrow the Arab monarchies by 2016, starting with Kuwait in 2013.181 Emirati 
officials declared that the “MB does not recognize national boundaries and sovereign 
rulers, and is seeking to use local sympathizers, like the al-Islah NGO, to undermine the 
stability of the UAE.”182 
In addition to the GCC states’ resentment of the Egyptian-Iranian relationship, the 
Egyptian-Turkish relationship also angered the Saudis. The two Islamic governments 
could encourage the new leaders and promoters of the Sunni Islamic branch and replace 
Saudi Arabia. After all, Turkey became a successful model that most Arab republic states 
wanted to emulate. This concern grew as both President Morsi and President Erdogan of 
Turkey showed support and sympathy to the Sunni-dominant states, rallying for the 
Palestinian cause and supporting Sunni rebels in Syria.183 
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While Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait saw the MB as a threat, Qatar saw the 
MB and the Arab Spring as an opportunity. Qatar’s support was mainly to enhance and 
extend its economic interests in the region. In addition to the bailout loan provided to 
Egypt during Morsi’s government, the Qatari support of Egypt was considered limited 
compared to the support offered to the Tunisian and Libyan governments during their 
political instability.184 During the democratic transition under President Morsi, Qatar was 
accused by the GCC states of supporting the MB regime, which intensified the crisis 
between Qatar and the other GCC countries. With its Al-Jazeera satellite TV, Qatar 
supported the Egyptian uprising and the MB, which provoked the Arab monarch rulers. 
While acknowledging its intention to project its economic power, Saudi Arabia thought 
that Qatar’s behavior was also a sign of a challenge to the monarchies and encouragement 
of an Islamist threat in the region. According to Gause, Qatar had dismissed its obligation 
to the GCC and overreached for power, “The Saudis have always thought the smaller 
Gulf States should just follow their lead on political issues.”185  
With the lead of Saudi Arabia, the GCC states were counter-revolutionary forces 
during the Arab Spring. The overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak and the success of 
Islamists in elections were signs of threats and challenges to the dynastic monarchies. 
The Islamists’ newly developed ideology to govern and rise to power threatened the 
existence of the Arab monarchies’ survivability. In the case of Egypt, the emergence of 
the MB as the new political power and President Morsi’s intention to pursue foreign 
policies that were different from his predecessor’s angered the Saudis, Emiratis, and 
Kuwaitis. Early in the revolution, while Saudi Arabia thought that President Morsi would 
not warm to Iran and Turkey at the expense of the Gulf States, President Morsi believed 
that Iran and Saudi Arabia should resolve their differences in order for stability in the 
region to reign. With a fear that the MB would export its ideology to the rest of the region 
and no longer concerned about losing Egypt as a potential ally, as it had been during 
Mubarak, the GCC states became firm believers that supporting the Egyptian military 
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would be the best strategy to maintain the regional balance of power and the status quo. 
The Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Emiratis came to the rescue of Egypt with $12 billion dollars, 
soon after the overthrow of President Morsi. This is an indication of the GCC states’ real 
intention to sabotage Morsi’s government in its transition to democracy. David Rothkop 
claims that the GCC states viewed the MB as a threat; they wanted to contain it, and 
“They are also writing checks to cover Egyptian military arms purchases for which the 
United States has halted funding.” 186  
The split of the Salafis al-Nour Party from the FJP to join the National Salvation 
Party, in support of the army, has more than one explanation. The dispute between the 
Salafis and the MB in the last days of Morsi’s rule cannot be explained by the failure of 
these two Islamists parties to share power or the undemocratic behavior of President 
Morsi. While many MB opponents condemned the military actions against civilians and 
MB supporters, the Salafis praised the army, and declared that they had no objection to a 
Sisi presidency. Jonathan Brown wrote, “On August 16, as the worst of the crackdown 
was playing out, al-Nour and Salafi issued a joint declaration affirming their support for 
the Egyptian army. The party has expressed only mildest concern for the killing of 
civilians.”187 Many activists, including Mohammed el Baradei and other liberals, do not 
refuse the possibility that the al-Nour Party is funded and supported by Saudi Arabia—
while the military runs the country, the Salafis will manage the religious institutions and 
teach a Saudi influenced Sunni Islam.188  
While there is no concrete evidence supporting the idea of Saudi Arabia’s 
involvement in shifting the Salafis’ alliance from the MB to the military, this explanation 
is consistent with the intention of the Saudis to halt the threat of the MB and regain Egypt 
as its ally against the Iranian threat. Another explanation to the split between the MB and 
the Salafis is that the latter wanted to secure some relative power and avoid the military’s 
brutality against Salafis. This possibility is less appealing. For one reason, the Salafis are 
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safer in their alliance with the MB. Another reason is that the Salafis will get less support 
from non Islamists than from the MB to push their political agenda. Hence, no matter 
what the conflict between the MB and the Salafis, from the beginning of the revolution, 
they knew that it was in their interests to stay united against an authoritarian regime and 
secularists. 
This analysis of the GCC states’ view of democracy and how they reacted to the 
popular uprising during the Arab Spring, illustrates the hostility of regional powers 
toward Egypt’s democratic transition. Contrary to the countries of Eastern Europe, 
democracy in Arab states is unwelcome by the region. The circumstances in which 
democracy occurred in Eastern Europe were more favorable; the fall of communism 
signaled that authoritarian regimes would not return, and proximity to the rest of Europe 
and desire for integration into the EU required democratization. In the model of Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia opposed democratic reform in order to support its monarchy. Unlike the 
Soviet Union, which did not oppose democracy in Eastern European countries, Saudi 
Arabia exerted a counter pressure during the Arab Spring on Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and 
Bahrain. Moreover, the prospect for Eastern European countries to join the EU and 
NATO contributed to the success of their transition to democracy. Such regional 
institutions that promote democracy are absent from the Middle East, which leaves most 
countries in the region to struggle with their transitions. While Western European 
countries provided hope to Eastern European countries that democracy would succeed, 
Egyptians were not certain about their path. The difficulty of the Tunisian transition, with 
the assassination of two political leaders and the changing of the government three times 
in the last two years, and the emergence of terrorist groups, made many Egyptians feel 
nostalgic for the authoritarian regime. Finally, the Algerian democratic experience in 
1991, which ended in a military coup, and Iraq’s ethnic divisions after the fall of Saddam 
are illustrations of the struggle and unlikelihood of democratic transitions in the Middle 
East. 
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2. Lack of Support from the International Community 
While European, Asian, and Latin American countries consolidated democracy as 
a result of enormous support from the U.S., the U.S. showed less commitment toward 
Egypt in its transition to democracy. The U.S. lost interest in the Middle East and 
delegated responsibility to regional actors.189 Taking into consideration the legacy of 
authoritarian regimes in the region and the fear of democracy by the GCC states, it can be 
concluded that the failure of transition to democracy was not a surprise. The lack of 
support from the international community, especially the U.S., left the Egyptian transition 
to democracy, under the MB regime, an inevitable failure. In this section, the thesis will 
not argue what the international community did, but what it did not do. I will address the 
failure of the U.S. to reconcile political stake holders, the failure of the U.S. and the EU 
to enforce civil society organizations (CSO), and finally, the failure of the U.S. to exert 
its leverage to push for a democratic transition in Egypt. 
The main problem for Morsi’s government during its transition to democracy was 
a lack of compromise and commitment to democracy from all political parties. The 
polarization during the last 18 months of the MB regime can be explained by the legacy 
of the authoritarian regimes that preceded the revolution and the lack of experience of the 
political actors to manage their differences in a democratic environment. Early in this 
stage of the transition, an international intervention from democratic advocate countries 
might have prevented Egypt from falling into a trap of polarization. The U.S. and EU 
failed to intervene as mediators between Islamists and secularists. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Egypt lacked its own road map and secularists failed to provide a better 
alternative on many issues. Instead, they left the negotiation table. The U.S. and EU 
could have brought all the actors together and emphasized the importance of following a 
road map to keep them united against an authoritarian regime. Egypt’s new experience 
with democracy made political actors fear each other. They treated democracy as a zero 
sum game where the gain of one party was considered a loss for the other, which made 
negotiations impossible. Instead, democracy does not guarantee that a party will get what 
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it wants. In most cases, political actors have to compromise to receive their second or 
third choice. However, democracy will guarantee the losers a chance to come back in the 
next rounds. 
Political actors in Egypt thought that they could manage this transition on their 
own, but they underestimated the power of the military. They faced their transition with 
little democratic behavior, and whenever an actor felt that he was losing, he took sides 
with the military. Moreover, the U.S. failed to address the issue of the military’s 
involvement in domestic politics. The U.S. could have at least played a minimal role and 
provided politicians with an opportunity to negotiate and settle their issues. In the case of 
Egypt, the military set the road map, drafted a constitution that suited its interests, and 
established the requirements for who would write the constitution. These issues could 
have been avoided if the political actors had set their own road map, visualized how 
power should be shared, and agreed on their own election dates without military 
intervention. 
The challenge that obstructed the U.S. and the EU from intervening was that 
Egyptians were reluctant to accept foreign intervention in their domestic affairs. Many 
citizens thought such interference would have undermined the democratic transition. The 
Al-Akhbar newspaper reported that the rise in anti-American sentiment prevented 
Egyptian actors from reaching an alliance with their U.S. counterparts, “Egypt refuses 
advice of the American Satan.”190 While this was true, having a neutral international 
actor as a mediator would have been beneficial for Egypt, to help it make sure that 
decisions were generated by its own politicians and that they were sticking to their road 
map. A successful intervention could have been induced by material incentives, such as 
economic and financial support that Egypt needed during its transition. Without such 
material incentives, the U.S. failed to support the transition to democracy in Egypt. 
According to Danya Greenfield and Amy Hawthorn, U.S. and EU rhetoric exceeded what 
really could have been achieved in supporting the democratic transition in Egypt, Tunis, 
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and Libya.191 Economic aid to Egypt needed to be more than the U.S. had already 
promised before the revolution. The support of trade and investment was conditioned by 
the country’s ability to stabilize its economy. The failure to fulfill its financial promise 
was an indication of the U.S.’s uncertainty of Egyptian democracy under MB rule, 
especially following the security chaos that the Middle East region had been experiencing 
since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Hawthorn argued: 
President Obama’s speech to the UN General Assembly was a corrective 
to his 2011 speech in which he stated that the U.S. would support these 
transitioning countries economically, militarily, and diplomatically. In his 
UN speech Tuesday, President Obama instead stated that the U.S. is 
supportive of these transitions, but that they are no longer America’s top 
priority in the region.192 
The U.S.’s actions and commitment to democracy in Egypt is influenced by the security 
in the region and the lack of support from Gulf countries of democracy.  
The new foreign policy of the U.S. provides an explanation of its lack of support 
for democracy in Egypt and the Middle East in general. The U.S. is balancing regional 
power by using the “buck passing” method, which consists of letting regional powers do 
the heavy lifting.193 This became clear during the recent regional crisis. European Union 
members handled the Crimea crisis without heavy intervention from the U.S. Also, 
during the Syrian crisis, the U.S. allowed Russia to settle the issue of chemical weapons. 
However, in the case of Egypt, letting the transition to democracy be handled by the 
regional power, Saudi Arabia became a conflict of interest—it was not in the interest of 
Saudi Arabia to see a democratic Egypt. Also, the U.S.’s involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan influenced its desire not to be involved in the Egyptian democratic 
transition. Many American politicians still believe that Iraq and Afghanistan are not 
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better off than before the U.S. invaded them, and that the U.S. should not act unilaterally 
on behalf of democracy in the region.194 
International involvement in promoting democratic institutions was deemed by 
Egypt to be too vested in its domestic policies. This issue continues today; however, the 
international community should enter into serious dialogue with the Egyptian government 
about the importance of democratic institutions’ roles in promoting justice and 
democracy. 
In addition to the lack of willingness by the international community to mediate 
among Egypt’s political actors, it also failed to promote democratic institutions in Egypt. 
The international community failed to convince the Egyptian government about the 
importance of CSOs in promoting justice and democracy. Even before the overthrow of 
Mubarak, the military and security forces undermined foreign organizations that were 
trying to promote Egyptian civil society. The Egyptian government implemented a law 
restricting the practice of local and international NGOs. American NGOs operating in 
Egypt found how hard it was for these organizations to function freely in Egypt. Egyptian 
law limited NGO funding as well as hampered them with an unclear legal process. For 
instance, in December 2011, security forces attacked 10 CSO offices and accused them of 
receiving illegal foreign financing and not having proper licenses to operate in Egypt. 
Also in June 2013, an Egyptian court sentenced 34 CSO activists, including several 
Americans, and the government cancelled their operations in Egypt.195 In Update: The 
Campaign against NGOs in Egypt, it was reported that “Egypt continues to violate 
freedom of expression, association, religion, and due process of law.”196 The NGO 
organizations played an important role during the last election and supported Egypt’s 
transition toward democracy by monitoring the 2011 parliamentary election. Clear law 
and free practice for NGOs without suppression and intimidation from the police and 
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government security agents will contribute to promoting awareness among the Egyptian 
people about elections, voting, and their importance as active citizens in building a civil 
society through which Egyptians can freely organize and communicate with their 
government. Egypt and the Middle-East, in general, are lacking civil organizations as a 
result of the authoritarian regimes that have dominated the region. To guarantee a 
democratic transition, a government needs to encourage its citizens, without any 
restrictions, to establish human rights and religious organizations, youth movements, and 
minority representation in order to strengthen democratic institutions. 
Other institutions that Egypt is lacking for its democracy are inclusive economic 
institutions. Over the past four decades, Egypt has failed to establish enough of these 
types of institutions. In this most recent transition period, neither the transitional 
government nor Morsi’s government prioritized these institutions. Many international 
institutions were established to promote and support small businesses. Only with these 
small businesses can Egypt escape its economic crisis, since 40 percent of Egyptians 
depend on this sector.197 The goal of these inclusive institutions is to train and provide 
resources to owners of small businesses in order to become efficient and compete on an 
international level.198  
Many international institutions are operating in Egypt; however, their efforts to 
promote democracy and operate freely have been resisted by the Egyptian government. 
With these institutions, citizens can be empowered to hold the government accountable 
by voicing their demands. With the promotion of small businesses, Egypt could bring 
back its middle class and ideally achieve equal distribution of wealth. The international 
community should stay engaged with the government of Egypt to help promote 
international institutions so that Egypt is less likely to put restrictions on their activities or 
accuse them of meddling in Egypt’s domestic affairs. 
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It was clear during Egypt’s attempted democratic transition that the U.S. limited 
its support because of Egypt’s reluctance toward foreign intervention or because of the 
GCC states’ intolerance of democracy. The U.S. did not use all possible leverage at its 
disposal to help democracy take place during Morsi’s government. The U.S. military has 
built strong ties with its Egyptian counterpart. American and Egyptian officers’ have 
conducted joint exercises, war games, and training. Many Egyptian officers have attended 
military schools in the U.S. These events have allowed military officers from both 
countries to establish personal connections. According to Hamid and Mandaville, 
“Egypt’s generals feel that proximity to U.S. generals generates a kind of honor and 
respectability.”199 This relationship was built over decades. For Egyptians to turn their 
backs on the savoir faire, ties, aid, and commitment from the U.S., to look for other 
“patrons” would be time consuming, costly, and not worth the risk if they are convinced 
that the U.S. is the most powerful and advanced military in the world. This is leverage 
that the U.S. could have used against the army and security forces to stop repressing 
Egyptian citizens. 
The second kind of leverage that the U.S. could have used was a U.S. intervention 
on behalf of Egypt to receive a better deal from the IMF. This was possible because the 
U.S. has the largest voting rights on the IMF’s board. The IMF’s conditional loan to 
implement fiscal and budgetary reforms as well as removing subsidies only angered 
Egyptian citizens and turned them against their government. The U.S. could have 
mediated for less restrictive loan conditions and facilitated additional loans from other 
national donors. While the GCC states were reluctant to provide financial support to 
Morsi’s government, the U.S. could have pressured them to cooperate. Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE depend on the U.S. for their security. The U.S. could have 
influenced them to support Egypt during its transition. However, the U.S. was satisfied 
with its relationship with Egypt based only on security. By using military leverage, 
mediating for financial aid, and pressuring the GCC states to support democracy, the U.S. 
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could have encouraged Egyptian politicians and international actors to enter into dialogue 
to achieve a compromise. 
 CONCLUSION C.
The sabotage by the GCC states and limited support from the international 
community degraded Egypt’s chance to succeed in its transition to democracy under the 
MB. On one hand, the Arab Spring and the success of Islamists in electoral polls was 
regarded as a threat by the GCC states to the survivability of their regimes. The Morsi 
government’s new foreign policy and the Salafis new ideology to govern gave more 
reasons to Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Emiratis not to support the democratic transition in 
Egypt. The shift of U.S. policy and interest away from the region, and Egypt’s reliance 
on powerful states within the region to resolve their own regional crises, limited Egypt’s 
chance of success to transition. On the other hand, the Egyptians’ resentment of foreign 
intervention in their domestic affairs and political polarization prevented the international 
community from providing full support to Egypt. The U.S. seemed unenthusiastic about 
the Egyptian transition to democracy and did not use all of its leverage to influence the 
Egyptian military and Saudi Arabia to support the transition. Rather, it was satisfied with 
a relationship based on security in the region, and it turned a blind eye to the actions of 
the Gulf States and the Egyptian military. 
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V. THE DEEP STATE AND DISSATISFIED ECONOMIC ELITE 
Many observers, such as Roshdy, Brown, and Rugman, attribute the failure of 
democracy in Egypt to the incompetence of President Morsi’s government.200 However, 
many indications point to the deep state and business elites playing crucial roles in 
deposing President Morsi and interfering to block the democratic transition. Once Morsi 
won the presidential election, the deep state and business elite worked together to limit 
his power.201 The army, police, media, and judiciary’s actions during the transition to 
democracy were more committed to a secular state as their interests did not coincide with 
those of the Islamists’.  The business elite foresaw that their economic objectives were 
contradicted by the Islamists’ economic agenda, and they feared that they could lose the 
status they had achieved over the past three decades. Sharing the same objectives, the 
deep state and economic elite teamed up against the MB and blocked the transition to 
democracy. 
From the start of Morsi’s rule, the MB lacked support from the police, the army, 
the judiciary, and the press. Khaled Fahmy, a historian at the American University in 
Cairo said, “So they are in power, but they are actually not in power.”202 Moreover, the 
military stripped president Morsi of power as it disbanded the parliament after the 
Supreme Constitutional Court claimed the parliamentary elections invalid. The police, 
whose many of its leaders remained loyal to Mubarak, refused to support the MB to 
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“During the one year of Morsi’s rule, crime increased and traffic clogged roads—
undermining not only the quality of life, but the economy—the police refused to deploy 
fully.”203 
The deep state interfered with sabotaging the MB to restore public order, enraging 
Egyptians against President Morsi’s government. It stirred social unrest through 
manipulation of variety of resources that many of Mubarak’s government remnants still 
controlled, such as energy and the security sectors.  Electricity blackouts and fuel 
shortages caused many protestors to turn against the MB. A couple of days after Morsi’s 
overthrow, electricity and fuel returned to normal, and the police returned to the streets to 
control protestors. According to Hubbard, in a few hours conditions in Egypt had 
improved, “Gas lines have disappeared, power cuts have stopped and the police have 
returned to the street.”204 In addition, the intelligence agency resumed operation, for the 
first time since Morsi had dissolved the agency for its inhumane conduct and repression 
under Mubarak’s regime.205 All these conspiracies against the MB would not have 
occurred without strong support from the state media. Since his election, the state media 
had heavily criticized President Morsi, and then presented Sisi as the savior of Egypt.  
Business leaders worked with remnants of the Mubarak regime to bring down 
Morsi. For instance, Mr. Sawiris, the wealthiest man in Egypt and the founder of the Free 
Egypt Party, used his own visual and written media to support the Tamarrod movement 
that ousted President Morsi. Sawiris claimed that the movement did not know that he was 
one of the key drivers of the Tamorrod movement.206 
This chapter will discuss the role and influence of the deep state and the economic 
elite in domestic and foreign affairs before and after President Morsi came to power, as 
well as their motivations in blocking the democratic transition. 
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 THE DEEP STATE A.
This section focuses primarily on the military since it is the most dominant force 
within the deep state. This section provides a brief history of the emergence of the deep 
state in Egypt from the time of President Gamal Abdel Nasser until the overthrow of 
President Morsi. It reveals the events and explores the motivations for the deep state to 
obstruct the transition to democracy under MB rule. The thesis asserts that the military 
interfered with the path of democracy in an attempt to preserve its interests in Egypt. 
Nasser created the foundation of the deep state, which consists of high ranking 
security officers and influential judges.207 The ambition and strength of the military 
posed a challenge to Nasser and all of Egypt’s subsequent presidents. Henceforth, over 
the last six decades, Nasser and his predecessors sought to reform the internal security 
services as a counterbalance to the growing ambition of the military. In 1967, President 
Nasser removed his opponent Field Marshal Abd al Hakim, who continuously challenged 
the president through his control of the military.208 After Nasser’s death, his successor, 
Anwar Sadat, faced similar challenges from Egyptian generals. President Sadat’s 
challenge to the military might have cost him his life: “President Sadat may have in fact 
been assassinated as a result of retribution by the officer corps for his removal of its 
leading generals,” Robert Springborg suspected.209 Sadat’s political agenda in the 1973 
war against Israel fueled the military officers’ resentment toward him. According to 
Springborg, the undermining of the military “heroes” of the 1973 war was one the 
reasons for Sadat’s assassination in 1981.210 Mubarak’s tactic of partnering with the 
military was based on both manipulation, as his predecessors had done, and remuneration  
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to guarantee the loyalty of its officers. Mubarak appointed a more loyal and “politically 
dull” Field Marshal Husayn Tantawi, and he increased the military’s economic 
interests.211 
The foundation of deep state was finally molded under Mubarak’s regime when 
military officers became involved into a system of corruption and presidential 
patronage.212 As a payback for their loyalty, the regime granted some officers the 
opportunity to pursue civilian careers in high state positions upon their retirement from 
service. Most of those officers were appointed to the civilian bureaucracy, in which they 
used their government power to amass political and economic influence. Uncommitted 
and untrustworthy officers were not promoted above the rank of Major; only officers who 
were loyal to Mubarak’s regime were able to make it to the rank of General.213  
President Mubarak pursued this tactic of integrating senior officers for three main 
reasons.214 First, it allowed him to contain the political challenge of military officers and 
the rising up of a powerful officer.215 In 1989, President Mubarak replaced Field Marshal 
Abu Ghazala with Field Marshal Tantawi. Ghazala’s popularity had grown high within 
the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF), and he therefore challenged Mubarak’s power, while 
Tantawi was more loyal to Mubarak’s regime and a far less capable politician.216 Second, 
Mubarak saw the growing number of Islamists within the armed forces as a threat to his 
regime and his life.217 This suspicion was confirmed by an attempt on his life during a 
visit to Addis Ababa in 1995.218 Henceforth, Mubarak relied on internal security services 
as a counterbalance to the military. Subsequently, security personnel grew to 1.4 million 
individuals, and the interior annual budget rose from $1.05 billion in 1990 to $3.7 billion 
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in 2008.219 Critical security positions were given to loyal military officers who reported 
directly to the president. Third, the cooption of senior military officers in Mubarak’s 
regime accelerated after Egypt’s economic liberalization experience in 1991.220  Senior 
officers supported the regime and took advantage of the flexibility that Mubarak afforded 
to them to pursue their own economic interests. The IMF’s conditions for Egypt to 
privatize state enterprises provided the opportunity for many senior officers who 
managed those enterprises to function as brokers, bidding on state owned assets and 
amassing wealth in their personal accounts.221 All these incentives created by Mubarak 
compelled high ranking military officers to ally with other beneficiaries of Mubarak 
regime to preserve their interests. 
The participation of senior military officers allowed the military to become deeply 
entrenched in the state apparatus and state economy. While Mubarak pacified senior 
officers with extra earnings in return for their political quiescence, he used them to 
maintain control of Egypt.222 Sayigh estimated that by 2012, at least 2,000 local 
government posts were held by former officers.223 Senior officers served as governors 
and mayors in most Egyptian provinces. Of the 27 governors in Egypt, President 
Mubarak’s appointees were almost 70 percent senior military officers and 20 percent 
police officers.224 In addition to their appointment in high profile government posts, 
former officers also occupied various positions throughout the civil service. They held 
critical positions in many universities and research centers, government hospitals, state 
radio and television, and sports stadiums.225 Also, many of the retired senior officers held 
managerial or consultancy posts in various companies that had been privatized, such as 
power, water, sanitation, communication, and oil and gas.226 The salary of a consultant in 
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these posts ranged from $1,000 to $4,670 a month, in addition to monthly allowances and 
bonuses of $1,667.227 The difference between officer pensions ($500 for a major general) 
and extra-income from these positions was wide.228 It is clear that these well paid civilian 
jobs provided incentives for military officers to give their loyalty to the regime. 
The military managed its own economy without parliament oversight. A portion 
of the income generated from the military economy was used as officers’ allowances, 
military housing, and the rest for military operations and procurement not covered by the 
defense budget.229 The military runs its economic empire in a similar way to civilian 
businesses, entering partnerships or joint ventures with local and foreign investors. The 
military controls around 150 holding companies and joint ventures, and many retirees are 
involved in hidden partnerships in these sorts of companies.230 
Over the past forty years, the Egyptian military’s professionalism was degraded, 
especially during Mubarak’s rule. Soldiers lacked discipline and required skills and 
knowledge to respond to national threat. By 2011, Tantawi, the minister of defense for 
twenty years, and his associate members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) were old—their ages far beyond the official age of retirement. They resisted 
retirement during the transition because of the challenge democracy posed to the 
economic benefits that they accrued during the Mubarak era.231 According to Yezid 
Sayigh, the loyalty of those officers to Mubarak allowed them to hold office for such a 
long time, rather than their professional merit.232 This claim was shared by many U.S. 
officers who had relationships with their counterparts in Egypt through military 
assistance programs: “the Egyptian Armed forces are no longer capable of combat.”233  
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These are evidence of lack of professionalism within the Egyptian military rank and file 
because of its senior leaders’ preoccupation with advancing their personal interest and 
involvement in domestic politics. 
During the last two decades, it has become hard for individuals from the lower-
middle-class to get into military colleges. Applications to military colleges were 
restricted to sons of college graduate parents who were rarely from lower-middle-class 
families. This requirement for entrance into the armed forces favored only the sons of 
officers.234 Nonetheless, the internal recruitment from the enlisted to the officer rank was 
limited to 10 percent of the total recruits, and those recruited would not pass the rank of 
captain before the official retirement age.235  
Before transferring power to civilians after the January revolution, the Egyptian 
military profited from this period to increase its power and involvement in politics. Days 
after the overthrow of Mubarak, the army imposed itself as the sole ruler to shape the 
transition to democracy. It created its own road map and drafted rules and laws that 
would safeguard its interests. The SCAF altered the military retirement law of 1975, 
which previously had not included further opportunity for retired senior officers to pursue 
civilian jobs within the state. The new law allowed senior officers to do so, and it 
introduced a 15% raise in the military personnel pensions.236 During May 2011, Tantawi 
issued a decree limiting prosecution of officers accused of corruption and had engaged in 
illicit business partnership under Mubarak’s regime to military courts.237 Also, to protect 
the military’s estates and various enterprises after the revolution, the military suspended 
Mubarak’s policy of privatization, avoiding any competition from businessmen and 
maintaining control over what was left of state companies.238 Further military influence 
on drafting of the 2012 constitution included article 195, which stipulated that the 
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minister of defense should be an active duty officer.239  Even Latin American states, 
some of the most militarized, do not require in their constitutions that the minister of 
defense be an active duty officer.240 While in Latin America, civilians dominate the 
National Security Council with a ratio of three civilians to one military, article 197 of 
Egypt’s 2012 constitution allows active military officers to dominate the council.241 
Moreover, the military added military conscription for up to three years, in order to 
guarantee the flow of low labor costs to its enterprises.242 Those are indications of how 
pervasive and powerful the Egyptian military had become.  
After the January 25 revolution the image of the military became worse as strikes 
against the military and retired officers running state enterprises became more frequent. 
Thousands of workers in the petroleum sector protested about their work conditions and 
the militarization of the oil industry.243 The pay inequality between the workers and the 
retired officers who ran these companies was exceptional. The military responded with 
force to these rioters, tried protestors in military courts, and sent many others to jail.244 
Workers at the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), which is comprised of 12 
companies headed by former Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Hamdi Wuhiba, 
complained about the military’s administration of this group of factories. Workers 
reported, “It is a bunch of retired army generals who came to the AOI to get both a 
pension from the army and a salary from the AOI. The problem with AOI’s bylaws is that 
they vest all powers to the lieutenant general, as though he was the word of God.”245 In 
their defense for managing state enterprises, military officers claim that they are better 
trained as managers, “the military produces the best managers,” Wuhiba said.246 
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Observers expected the Egyptian military to present a great challenge to any 
incoming president, regardless of his political orientation, whether Islamist, liberal, or 
leftist. Diminishing the power of the military was a challenging task, as previous 
presidents have tried and failed. The more they tried, the more the generals fought back. 
During Morsi’s rule, the deep state obstructed government policies and reforms and 
impeded public service delivery, undermining the performance and legitimacy of the 
democratically elected civilian authorities. Yezid supported this observation as he 
asserted, “Only after the officers’ republic is completely extricated from the Egyptian 
state and dismantled can Egypt’s second republic [is] born.”247 It is no surprise that the 
retired generals who ran and controlled the natural gas and oil companies, including 
multiple gas stations, planned the gas shortages and power blackouts during Morsi’s 
presidency. 
The alliance of the Egyptian military with the MB, rather than with secularists, 
was a thoughtful move to maintain the economic and political powers of the deep state. 
After the January revolution, security forces crumbled in 18 days, while the military 
maintained its status.248 The latter needed a partner who could silence the streets, while 
presenting little threat to its economic and political interests. Between secularists and 
Islamists, the military sided with the MB because it shared a similar hierarchical structure 
that ensured responsiveness.249 This condition appealed to top military to strike a deal 
with the MB’s top leaders. By contrast, secularists were not a unitary group that acted 
cohesively, and they had lost a connection with and credibility of the Egyptian society 
long before. Moreover, secularists were expected to demand submission of the military 
under civilian control. According to Mona El-Ghobashy, the deal between the MB and 
the SCAF was based on power sharing among them. The SCAF would allow the MB to 
dominate the parliament and, in return, the SCAF would choose the incoming president 
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in order to keep the key state offices safe from unexpected changes.250 The deal between 
the SCAF and the MB was broken when the MB decided to run in the presidential 
elections. As discussed in Chapter III, the MB’s decision to run in the elections was a 
result of the SCAF’s support for Ahmad al Shafiq as a candidate. This event could be 
interpreted as the beginning of the rift and mistrust between the military and the MB. Any 
move by the military was regarded by the MB as collaboration with the remnants of 
Mubarak’s influence to control the MB’s power. Whereas any attempt of reform by 
Morsi’s government was regarded by its opponents as another step of the MB to control 
state institutions. 
The security crisis in the Sinai provided an excuse for President Morsi to replace 
Tantawi with General Sisi who was then the head of military intelligence and had already 
established a relationship the MB.251 Sisi, who was ranked 67 in seniority in the army, 
retired those above him, allowing himself to be the most senior officer.252 With the 
departure of many senior military officers associated with corruption, the military 
gradually restored its reputation damaged by previous corrupt generals. The appointment 
of General Sisi as the head of the Ministry of Defense instead of Field Marshal Tantawi 
was supported by many army officers who agreed that Tantawi was inept, and that his 
decisions hampered the Army’s reputation.253  For many opponents of Morsi, this 
appointment was another strategic move by President Morsi to grab for more power and 
put the strongest institution under the MB’s control.  General Sisi was an Islamic 
sympathizer, and his intelligence background would have helped President Morsi to have 
access to information within the army, “El-Sisi has all the keys to all the doors,” an 
Egyptian told Peter Hessler.254 
With Sisi the head of the Ministry of Defense, the struggle between the military 
and the MB was not over. The MB and the Egyptian military entered a new phase of 
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struggle that resulted from changes in leadership, as many observers predicted, including 
Springborg and Okasha. In this phase, one of the issues that the MB had to face was to 
lift the ban on Islamists entering the military and security forces.255 Such a demand from 
the MB was regarded by the SCAF as a way to infiltrate the military. Senior officers 
claimed that they did not discriminate against candidates who had ties with the 
Brotherhood; however, they blocked access to any who had an ideology that benefited a 
political group, rather than benefiting the nation.256 Members of the MB had been denied 
access to the armed forces because they were accused of infiltrating the Army by 
establishing a secret unit of members of the MB.257  
The second confrontation between Sisi and the MB developed when suspicions 
grew among Egyptians that the MB had a hand in recent national security crises, 
especially the Sinai crisis.258 The Armed Forces Decree 203/2012 issued by General Sisi 
left a bitter feeling among the Brotherhood.259 The decree prohibited ownership of 
property in Sinai within five kilometers from the Gaza border, leaving that land in 
possession of the military.260 While the decree was proclaimed as a security measure to 
allow the army freedom to maneuver and curb arms trafficking, a conspiracy theory 
suggested that the MB was about to “sell out” the land and the people of Egypt.261 It was 
suggested that the decree taken by Sisi was to halt the MB from selling the land to the 
Palestinians with the support of the Qataris.262 Another conspiracy suggested was that 
Hamas and the MB were planning to enter a joint venture in the Sinai. Retired General 
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Mahmud Khalaf, a military consultant at the Nasser Military Academy said, “Joint 
ventures are being quietly established. They will pave the way for a free zone in Sinai 
with Hamas and Gaza dominating development projects in the peninsula.” 263 Since the 
Sinai crisis, the Army started re-asserting itself, trying to have the upper hand on all 
national security issues. This claim was proven to be true when the Army opposed the 
nomination of Rifaat Muhammad Tantawi by the MB as the foreign minister, because of 
his opposition stance to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.264 Moreover, the initiative of 
President Morsi to improve the Egyptian-Iranian relationship after his invitation to the 
president of Iran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, was resented by the army.265 While this 
relationship was interpreted by the military as a step toward changing the Egyptian 
security policy, President Morsi believed that the Iranian was a critical player in 
negotiating peace in Syria.266 
The disagreement between the military and President Morsi regarding the national 
security policies elevated the level of distrust between them. After restoring the military’s 
reputation, Sisi became more open politically. On December 11, 2012, General Sisi 
called for a national dialogue between the Islamists and secularists after the conflict about 
drafting the constitution.267 Sisi’s initiative to intervene as a mediator was rejected by 
President Morsi who saw this initiative as interference by the army in domestic 
politics.268 Also, Morsi regarded the army as subordinate to the president and not the 
opposite. Such a dismissal of Sisi’s initiative by President Morsi undermined any chance 
of reconciliation as well as the credentials of the Minister of Defense.269 The decision 
eliminated the chance for reconciliation among political actors; it turned Sisi against 
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President Morsi who completely undermined the power of the Army. While it was 
necessary to submit the military to civilian control, President Morsi should have 
understood that he could not succeed without the support of the military. Proof of that 
was when all of Morsi’s attempts to bring secularists to the table for negotiation failed. 
This embarrassment of the army was a signal to all of Morsi’s opponents to gain the 
army’s support and side with it, as the MB had done early in the revolution. It was only a 
matter of time until the army moved against President Morsi.270 
The MB faced a challenging task to control the armed forces. Its economic and 
institutional resources outnumbered those of any other political party size.271 Between 
civilian workers and conscripts, a third of the Egyptian labor force depended on the 
armed forces.272 The influence of the military in Egyptian politics and the economy 
prevented political parties from forming a pact against the armed forces and placing it 
under civilian control. Instead, political parties, first the Islamists and then the secularists, 
sided with the army in their fight against each other. During the early transition, the army 
tailored the constitution in a way that guaranteed and safeguarded its economic and 
political interests. The dispute between President Morsi and General Sisi was mainly 
about national security, especially the security crisis on the Sinai and the distrust of the 
Brotherhood in the armed forces. The move of President Morsi against the military sent 
two conflicting messages. For those who were pro-Morsi, it was a necessary move to 
establish civilian control over the military, and it was the call of most Egyptians during 
the January revolution. On the contrary, the anti-Morsi camp interpreted the move as a 
step by the MB to control the armed forces to serve its political interest. 
Failing to modernize is one of the factors that compelled the military not to 
tolerate democracy to take hold. Modernization means to integrate “the technical 
sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment.”273 Such attempts to 
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modernize the military by Mubarak and Sadat had failed, or it is more accurate to say the 
military was successful in opposing those attempts. As the years passed, officers became 
more accustomed to playing economic and political roles rather than professionalizing 
their soldiers and enhancing their equipment. “So the elephant continued to expand and 
grow flabby, grazing freely in state provided pastures.”274 On different occasions, the 
military demonstrated its lack to counter national threats and respond to crises. Of the 
many crises that show the lack of professionalism within the military ranks, one incident 
related to the response of the army to terrorism stands out. Army officers underestimated 
the threat of terrorist groups in Sinai—Operation Eagle was an evidence of the army’s 
inability to counter terrorism. The failure of this operation led to the dismissal of Field 
Marshall Tantawi. For a while, the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in Cairo 
urged senior Egyptian officers to upgrade their equipment for counter-terrorism, but the 
latter ignored those suggestions and kept using U.S. aid for acquisition of highly 
sophisticated airplanes and their maintenance.275  
A transition to democracy cannot be achieved without the support of internal 
security forces.276 Unfortunately, like the military, the Ministry of Interior influenced the 
fate of the Egyptian transition to democracy under the MB’s rule. The Ministry of 
Interior, which includes the intelligence and internal state security, elevated the chaos and 
political instability in Egypt, as the police failed to control people on the street. While 
some of the police force refused to intervene to stop aggressors, others were manipulated 
to stoke hatred among the Egyptians. During the transition to democracy, the state 
security proved that it was not willing to renounce its primary mission, shaping the 
political sphere as a continuation of Mubarak’s era.277 The security situation was bad 
enough for President Morsi to call on the army to intervene. Shortly after the revolution, 
                                                 
274 Springborg, “Democratic Control of the Egyptian Armed Forces: Wait Sitting Down,” 1. 
275 Ibid., 11. 
276 Michael Kremer, “‘Old Habits Die Hard’: Police Reform in Egypt Beyond a ‘Makeover,’” 
FikraForum (Blog), November 16, 2011, http://fikraforum.org/?p=1717.  
277 Tewfic Aclimandos, “Healing without Amputating? Security Sector Reform in Egypt,” Arab 
Reform Initiative (2012, September), 4. http://www.arab-reform.net/security-context-transitions.  
 87
police forces went on strikes, demanding a pay raise.278 Then, in many cases, police 
refused to respond to emergency calls, claiming that their pay was not worth the risk. 
Those who stayed loyal to the old regime, acted as protestors against each other by using 
baltaguis (thugs) to infiltrate genuine protestors, turning peaceful protests to violent ones.  
Since the Mubarak regime, those baltaguis were paid by security forces to gain 
information and do dirty jobs for them.279 As a response to the call of many Egyptians to 
reform the Ministry of Interior in the early days of the revolution, Habib el-Adly, Interior 
Minister from 1997-2011, was sentenced to 12 years in jail for corruption and murder 
charges.280 His successor, Mansour al-Essawi, who was an element of Mubarak’s regime 
remnants, did little to reform the Ministry of Interior.281 The security institution was one 
of the failed institutions after the break of Mubarak’s regime. President Morsi faced a big 
challenge to reform it and make it functional in a short period and during a critical time. 
Among the challenges was the need for funding to implement new techniques and 
improve training for police forces.282 Reform would demand support from all political 
actors. Finally, reform required authority to dispose of all the corrupt officers in the 
security agencies.283 Michael Kremer claimed that al-Adly had more than a thousand 
men; getting rid of them would deprive the Ministry of Interior of experienced staff, and 
no doubt allow further collapse of the institution.284 
In defense of the MB, Mahmoud Hussein, Secretary General of the MB, claimed 
that the clash between Islamists and the anti-Morsi movement was planned. The police 
did not intervene in the fight—security forces allowed protestors to reach the wall of the 
palace on December 2012, intentionally to embarrass the president.285 Many of the 
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Brotherhood were attacked by armed men who were paid to do that, and most of the dead 
and injured were Morsi supporters. Moreover, those who had been detained by Morsi’s 
supporters and handed to the police were soon after released.286 After this incident, 
President Morsi became suspicious about the Minister of Interior’s intent to undermine 
the MB government, and replaced him.287 The replacement of the Minister of Defense 
and the Minister of Interior was a necessary move based on their mediocre performances. 
It was clear that the old regime and the deep state were out for revenge. On the other 
hand, the anti-Morsi camp regarded the replacements of ministers and governors as 
signals of exercising total control and domination over the state institutions. 
In addition to the armed forces’ unwillingness to foster a smooth transition to 
democracy, the judiciary used all of its power to impede the MB from success as well. 
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), a remnant of the Mubarak regime, allied with 
the military. Jurists used their power to refute any parliamentary decision or election at 
any time based on previous laws.288 The dissolution of the elected parliament on June 
2012 was an indication of the SCC and the military working together, claiming to prevent 
the MB from overreaching for power.289 In June 2012, the army disbanded the 
parliament, just days before handing power to President Morsi. The decision was made 
after the judiciary declared a flaw in the law that regulated the election of the People’s 
Assembly. The timing of the decision and failure to oversee the electoral laws raised 
suspicions and undermined the SCC’s credibility. Nathan Brown reported, “It was also 
highly damaging to the SCC’s own stance of political neutrality and pulled the court into 
a political dispute…the court was considered in many quarters to be operating as a 
partisan institution.”290 A new president stripped of all power meant only two things, 
either he had to submit to a ruling army, or he was destined to fail.291 President Morsi, in 
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his first attempt to fight back, tried to reconvene the parliament. When the court rejected 
his demand, on November 2013, Morsi issued a decree to restore his presidential 
power.292 President Morsi claimed that the decree was temporary until a new elected 
parliament was in place, but the anti-Morsi camp saw the decree as another move from 
the MB toward Islamic rule.293 This was the critical move that compelled all unsatisfied 
politicians to rally their supporters and take them to the streets, demanding the end of 
President Morsi’s rule. This situation would have been different if President Morsi had 
consulted and gained support from secularists before issuing his decree. 
 THE BUSINESS ELITE  B.
Most of the business elite owed their political and economic status to Mubarak’s 
regime. This class continued to exert its influence during the MB’s regime. Its lack of 
support for the MB during the transition to democracy undermined the legitimacy of 
Morsi’s government. This section of the thesis explores the critical role of the business 
elite in defending their economic and political interests, thereby leading to the overthrow 
of President Morsi. Most importantly, the thesis will analyze the reason behind the 
business elite’s unwillingness to cooperate with the MB. 
The January 25 Revolution was aimed at ending Mubarak’s regime, including his 
crony capitalists. Most Egyptian entrepreneurs were able to maintain their influence, with 
the exception of a few who had been tried during the SCAF and Morsi rules. The MB 
followed the steps of the old regime, trying to create an alliance with the business elite. 
According to Stephan Roll, the MB ignored the demand by civil society to bring to 
justice the corrupt business tycoons; instead, it sought to integrate this group into its 
regime. 294 The MB pursued a similar economic strategy initiated by Mubarak during the 
infitah or liberalization plan. The economic crisis that Egypt had witnessed over the past 
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few years, and the business elite’s political influence, compelled President Morsi to try 
siding with them, rather than opposing them. By 2008, 30 percent of the stock in the 
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) belonged to only eleven business families, and the private 
sector employed 73 percent of the work force in Egypt.295 Regardless of the demand of 
Egyptians to investigate these business elites who had amassed their wealth through illicit 
methods and connections to Mubarak, the economic situation in Egypt did not allow any 
new government to clash with business entrepreneurs. 
In addition to its economic influence, the business elite acquired political 
influence through President Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak. As the chairman of the 
National Democratic Party (NDP) and the successor of his father to preside over Egypt, 
Gamal integrated most of the wealthiest entrepreneurs into his political party, and in 
return they benefited from his economic policy.296 While the military was not pacified by 
the growing power of the business elite, in reality, these two groups realized that their 
interests would be met only if they cooperated. Many generals became advisors and 
business partners with members of the business class.297 For instance, businessman 
Shafiq Gabr, supplied the armed forces with civilian and military equipment; Moataaz al-
Alifi, the head of the Kharafi Group and one of the most influential businessmen in 
Egyptian politics, entered into a joint venture with the armed forces.298 The 
businessmen’s political power and connection to the military and judiciary allowed them 
to escape court trials. In addition to fleeing the country after the revolution, the Illicit 
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Moreover, many of the culpable business families paid financial compensation for their 
misappropriation of public funds and tax evasion, which was made possible after the 
SCAF’s amendment of the investment law.300 
Many Egyptian businessmen resented Morsi’s regime, and did not want to ally 
with it, for two main reasons. First, they mistrusted the MB, and felt that sooner or later 
they would be arrested and tried. This became evident during Morsi’s speech to 
crackdown on corrupted companies, “governmental watchdogs would investigate the 
alleged corruption.”301 On that same day, Morsi’s comment affected the stock exchange 
which plummeted to one of its lowest levels of trade.302 Second, businessmen had little 
confidence in the MB to govern, most of its leaders lacked experience in restoring the 
Egyptian economy.303 The rejection of the MB and favoring of secularists by the 
business elites became clear during the presidential elections as they supported and 
funded Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister under Mubarak. The tight result of the 
second round in the presidential elections would have been different without support of 
the business elite, “a whole army of fearful businessmen behind him.”304 Support of the 
Egyptian secular party through the establishment of propaganda against Morsi’s 
government and boycotting investments were major factors in changing the Egyptians’ 
perception of the MB. 
Much of the Egyptian media, such as satellite TV and newspapers were owned by 
businessmen who had close ties to Mubarak’s regime. Included among these individuals 
are three of the wealthiest families in Egypt: the Sawiris, the Bahgats, and the al-
Badawis.305 Through their media, these families supported Mubarak through the first half 
of the revolution; then they switched sides when they believed that there was no chance 
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for Mubarak to stand against the mass protests. During the presidential election, the MB 
accused these non-government media sources of “one-sided” support for the presidential 
candidate Ahamad Shafiq. An illustration of this media malpractice was by ONTV 
satellite, owned by the Sawiris. Many observers raised questions during the second round 
of the presidential elections about its choice of talk hosts that seemed to be supporters of 
Shafiq.306 After the election, these private media outlets became more critical of the MB. 
The Capital Broadcasting Center (CBC) was founded by al-Amin who was connected to 
old regime. Al-Amin hired reporters and media stars that were known for their opposition 
to the MB, such as Bassem Youssef. The MB’s attempt at rapprochement with the 
independent media was unsuccessful as it failed to compete against satellite channels and 
independent newspapers. Yet, the MB attempted to control the state-owned media was 
confronted by sharp public criticism.307 
In addition to a lack of media support by the business elite, the MB faced a 
problem of the business elite not stepping up to revitalize the Egyptian economy. Despite 
President Morsi’s initiative to reconcile with the business elite by providing them 
reassurance, many of the business families chose to stay out of Egypt.308 It was not until 
the ousting of President Morsi that business families returned home and started investing 
again in the Egyptian economy. The case of the Sawiris family is an illustration of the 
economic challenge that the MB faced during its transition. The travel ban lifted on the 
Sawiris family did not entice them to invest and support the economy.309 The Sawiris 
started reinvesting in the Egyptian economy only after the fall of President Morsi. For 
example, the family bid for a share in the European Financial Group (EFG), Hermes, 
only after the military took over the MB. Financial analysts considered this deal one of 
the largest financial transactions that took place after the 2011 revolution, and it was a 
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signal to other Egyptian businessmen to re-start investing, “This sends a message that 
there is confidence from a high-profile businessman who had previously exited the 
Egyptian market,” an analyst said about the Sawiris’ bid.310  
 CONCLUSION C.
The military is not interested in democracy; democracy would mean the surrender 
of its political and economic interests. Egyptian generals are anticipated to challenge any 
transitional government regardless of its political orientation. Since President Nasser’s 
time, the lesson learned is that the more the government tries to place the military under 
civilian control, the more the generals fight back. President Morsi’s regime was no 
exception. Over the last six decades, the influence of the military has increased and it has 
been used for regime legitimacy. In addition to managing its own economy, senior 
officers have become deeply entrenched in the state apparatus and state economy. They 
have held high profile ministerial and local government posts, as well as managerial and 
consultancy posts in state and private companies. 
Soon after the January 25 Revolution, the military allied with the MB as part of a 
strategic move to best guarantee its interests. On the one hand, the MB was well-
structured and organized, while secular parties lacked cohesion, and had lost connection 
and credibility within the Egyptian society. This deal broke, however, soon after the two 
institutions lost trust in each other during the presidential elections. While the support of 
the military and business elite for Ahmad Shafiq was seen by the MB as a chance to 
reinstate the old regime, the MB’s competition in the presidential election was interpreted 
by its opponents as a sign of overreaching for power. Moreover, before handing over 
power to President Morsi, the army created its own road map, and manipulated the 
constitution in order to safeguard its interests, as well as worked with the judiciary to 
strip power from the new president. During this transition, the role of the judicial branch, 
as an independent branch of government was questionable—many observers claimed that 
the judiciary operated as a partisan institution, favoring secular parties. President Morsi’s 
initiative in taking control of the situation was publicly criticized, and it is considered the 
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turning point at which the Egyptian people returned to the streets, protesting against 
President Morsi for grabbing power. In this chaos, the security forces, business elite, and 
the military, which opposed the MB regime, pulled the strings that overthrew Morsi’s 
government. 
After the revolution, the Ministry of Interior intentionally failed to restore public 
order because of its leaders’ loyalty to Mubarak regime. Police refused to intervene to 
restore order on the streets. Instead, they used their old methods to spread hatred among 
protestors and turn peaceful demonstrations to violent ones. Likewise, the business elite 
mistrusted the MB. Their fear of trial and lack of confidence in the MB to save the 
economy compelled them to undermine Morsi’s government. They funded the anti-Morsi 
media and boycotted investments in the Egyptian economy during Morsi’s time. 
The economic and political crises, in addition to national security degradation 
during this transition period, provided the military the opportunity to take revenge, 
restore its reputation, and emerge as the savior of Egypt. None of the attempts of the MB 
and President Morsi toward reform were regarded as recognition of the public demand to 
contain corruption, abolish the brutality of security forces, and submit the military to 
civilian control. Instead, President Morsi’s attempts to deal with these public demands 
were seen as an attempt to overreach for power. This approach to these issues does not 
imply that the MB tried its best to include various parties in this process. This argument, 
rather, is more about the lack of political cooperation that inhibited Morsi’s government 
to succeed in his reform initiatives. Reform of the military and the Ministry of Interior 
was deemed impossible in a short time, as these institutions have been deeply integrated 
into the corrupt regime. Changing top positions is not enough for reform. The Mubarak 
system had controlled these institutions from top down, and it was impossible to achieve 





This conclusion will synthesize the findings of the four hypotheses presented in 
the thesis in order to identify the critical factor that led to the failure of Egypt’s 
democratic transition.  Then it will identify a lesson from Egypt’s experience under 
transition during the Muslim Brotherhood’s governance. Additionally, it will highlight 
the implications of this experience as could be applied by policy makers in the region.  
 FINDINGS  A.
The three hypotheses discussed in Chapters I, II, and IV indicate that Egypt’s 
chance in transition to democracy was slim, but not impossible with the formation of a 
political pact. The elite’s lack of commitment to change was a crucial factor in Egypt’s 
failed democratic transition. International influence and internal circumstances made it 
harder for the elites to decide on whether to compromise. The division and distrust 
between secularists and Islamists allowed for third parties to intervene in the path of 
democracy and contributed to more political chaos. 
The MB’s challenge after the ousting of Mubarak was to transform a competing 
organization to a ruling political power. This became especially difficult as it faced a 
political landscape and institutions that were deeply involved with the previous 
authoritarian regime. All political actors behaved undemocratically. Due to the lack of 
confidence and distrust among them, they failed to stand up to the entrenched 
authoritarian regime. The military controlled the process of transition and established 
rules which hindered the chance of cooperation among the Egyptian elites.  
There is enough evidence that Egyptian political actors were caught by surprise in 
the revolution and missed an opportunity to transition to democracy by failing to design a 
plan for transition. The MB capitalized on its mobilizing structures and its appeal to the 
population to amass all the power. Its early alliance with the military, rather than an 
alliance with secularists, left the latter with no guarantees or benefit from this transition. 
As they were pushed away from any key decisions in this phase, secularists believed that 
the MB had “hijacked” the revolution and that Egypt was on its way toward an 
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Islamocracy state. This false start to the transition provided little room for the elites to 
engage in give-and-take. Later in the transition, while the MB tried to sympathize with 
liberal and secular groups, the latter decided to cut short the process of negotiation and 
boycott the constitutional assembly. This was a shortfall on the part of secularists, as they 
preferred to protest and use the courts and military to solve their disagreement with the 
MB, rather than keeping negotiations open and articulating their vision about the 
constitution. Secularists and liberals acted in a more threatening than negotiating manner 
as they allied with the military, gained support of the business elite, and they were joined 
in their ranks by the Salafists. 
Early in the transition, the MB feared the deep state and underestimated secular 
groups, which explains its initial alliance with the military. Involving seculars in planning 
the transition such as the timing and sequence of elections, sharing power, and crafting 
the constitution would have eliminated the possibility of conflict later on in the transition. 
This was the first shortfall of the MB. The alliance of the MB and the military is 
understandable considering the latter’s history and its entrenchment in the state institution 
as well as the lack of political experience and competence of non-Islamist groups. 
Alliance and sharing power with the military, without the alliance with secularists, led to 
further challenges that the MB faced during its transition. The disagreement between the 
military and the MB regarding the presidential election triggered the split between these 
two organizations. The military’s support of Omar Suleiman, former Vice President 
during Mubarak’s rule, was considered by the MB as a sign of the return of Mubarak’s 
regime, which compelled the MB to change its decision and participate in the presidential 
election.  
From this point until the deposition of president Morsi, Islamists found 
themselves without any alliance. Meanwhile, secularists acknowledged their own 
interests in allying with the military. This alliance was the biggest challenge for the MB 
and Morsi’s government as it attempted to draft the constitution, establish economic and 
political reforms, and restore security and order in Egypt. 
Economic reform was difficult because of the military’s involvement in the 
economy, the high rate of unemployment, the diminishing numbers of the middle class, 
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lack of security, outflow of capital, and withdrawal of FDI as a result of widespread 
corruption. It was in the interest of the military and business elites to maintain the 
economic policy that they enjoyed under Mubarak’s regime. Along with its attempt to 
implement economic reforms, the MB faced a challenge of stirring social unrest and 
public instability. Morsi’s government hesitated to make such economic reforms, 
especially when the government and private and political parties were divided. Their lack 
of compromise only pushed dissatisfied Egyptians back to the street to protest and further 
undermine the legitimacy of Morsi’s government. A rift between Islamists and non-
Islamists deepened during the phase of crafting the constitution. President Morsi’s 
response to this lack of cooperation from secularists in the absence of a constitution was 
to rule by decree in order to restore stability during the transition period. 
After failing to form an alliance with secularists, the MB found itself single-
handedly controlling the military, police, and Mubarak’s remnants. Given the MB’s 
inability to reform these groups, the deep state and business elite teamed up against the 
MB and blocked the transition to democracy. The military, police, media, judges, and 
business class sided with secularists as they realized that their interests did not coincide 
with those of the Islamists’. The military stripped President Morsi of power by 
disbanding the parliament after the Supreme Constitutional Court claimed the invalidity 
of the parliamentary election. The police refused to back the MB in its fight against social 
upheaval to restore order and peace in Egypt. Business leaders helped the remnants of 
Mubarak’s regime to bring down President Morsi as they took their money out of the 
country, and used their media to portray the MB negatively among the Egyptian people 
and drove the Tamorrod movement. 
President Morsi’s attempt to submit the military to civilian control was interpreted 
by MB’s opponents as an attempt to control the country’s most influential institution and 
to infiltrate the military. The military’s unwillingness to give up its political and 
economic interests and its inability to modernize compelled its senior officers to oppose 
democracy. Similarly, the MB without the support of the political elites, failed to reform 
the Ministry of Interior. Replacing the top leaders in the Ministry of Interior was not 
enough to get rid of corruption and undermine the influence of the old regime. Although 
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the Ministry of the Interior was over-staffed with corrupt officers, their displacement 
would have deprived it from inexperienced staff. 
The economic and political crises, in addition to national security degradation, 
during the transition period, provided the military with an opportunity to recover for 
revenge, restore its reputation, and emerge as the savior of Egypt. Moreover, the division 
among political actors also contributed to sabotage by the GCC States and limited 
support from the international community which also degraded the chance of Egypt to 
succeed in its transition to democracy under the MB. On one hand, the Arab Spring and 
the success of Islamists in electoral polls was regarded as a threat by the GCC States to 
the survivability of their regimes. The Morsi government’s new foreign policy, and the 
Salafis’ new ideology to govern, gave more reasons to Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Emiratis not 
to support the democratic transition in Egypt. Other than rhetoric, the U.S. did not use all 
of its leverage to influence the Egyptian military and Saudis to support the transition. 
Rather, it maintained a relationship based on security in the region, and turned a blind eye 
to the actions of the Gulf States and the Egyptian military. 
All of this undemocratic behavior from all political actors, including the MB, was 
the result of a false start of the democratic transition. To safeguard its economic and 
political interests, the military took the initiative to set the rules for the transition and 
implement a road map that triggered the early friction among the political actors and 
inhibited them from forming a political pact against the entrenched authoritarian regime. 
The distrust among the political actors allowed the military to emerge as the strongest 
participant during this transition and the favorite entity to ally with in order to defeat 
other opponents. The alliance of the MB and the military in the early transition, and later 
on secularists allied with the military to depose President Morsi contributed to the failure 
of the transition to democracy.  
The political actors failed to understand the importance of a political pact. Their 
success needed to be based on their ability to compromise and share power; otherwise, 
their division would provide a chance for the old regime to reemerge. The Egyptian 
experience reveals that the incompetence and inexperience of the political actors in this 
transition led to a failure to stand united against Mubarak’s entrenched regime. Most of 
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the evidence supports that secularists, Islamists, and the military failed to form a pact 
during the period of extraction from an authoritarian regime. The only early deal struck 
was between the military and the MB, leaving the rest of the actors out of the picture. The 
deal, as discussed in Chapter II, was about sharing power; however, a lack of details and 
specifics about the conditions concerning who the president should be spurred a split 
between the MB and the military. Additionally, the road map for the transition was 
established by the military which wanted to guarantee its political and economic interests. 
Discarding the rest of the political actors from this process resulted in further issues along 
the transition, such as the sequence and the timing of the elections and the requirements 
and conditions for the elected personnel drafting the constitution. In the absence of 
negotiations and compromise, Egyptian political actors were divided and everything was 
left to competition, which favored the Islamists who are better organized to compete and 
win elections. 
Even though Egypt was not ripe for democracy because of the absence of a 
middle class, poverty, and an economic crisis, the unification of political actors would 
have eased these hardships and convinced the Egyptian population of the need for their 
cooperation and sacrifice to save the country from economic and social collapse. The 
IMF loan was necessary to save the economy, but the conditions of this loan, from fiscal 
reforms to eliminating subsidies on basic necessities, would have posed the risk of 
encouraging an unsatisfied population to return to the streets to protest. Only a 
commitment by the political elites to convince Egyptians about the importance of the 
economic reforms would have eased tensions of Egyptians and guaranteed economic 
recovery. 
The military intervention in Egyptian politics could have been avoided with a 
political pact among all political actors. Morsi’s government succeeded in sending the 
military back to the barracks and retiring many senior officers. The intervention of the 
military would not have happened without the continuous protests on the streets 
motivated by political division. Without these protests the police, business elites, and the 
old regime would not have had a chance to come back for revenge against the MB. 
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Moreover, the effects of international influence could have been avoided if the 
political actors had resolved their issues during the transition. . The political actors’ 
commitment in Egypt did not motivate international actors to help the country succeed at 
its transition by providing financial support and promoting foreign investments. While 
the Middle East has lacked experience in democratic transitions that could have been 
imported to Egypt, and the GCC states posed threats to democracy, these two factors 
inhibiting democracy in the region could have been overcome by the Egyptians’ 
commitment to democracy. Political polarization prevented the international community 
from providing full support to Egypt. The U.S. could have used military leverage to 
convince the Egyptian military to submit to civilian control, as well as help Egypt receive 
financial support from different countries. 
 LESSON LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS B.
For Middle Eastern countries interested in a transition from authoritarian regimes, 
Egypt’s transition provides an important lesson on what not to do in order to avoid an 
uncertain transition. The Egyptian transition is an illustration of the importance of a 
political pact to allow the country to extract itself from a robust authoritarian regime that 
has dominated the political landscape for decades. Early in a transition, the key success to 
democracy depends on the commitment of the political elite to stand united against any 
intruders during this phase. They have to reach a compromise and settle their differences 
to establish a road map and the transition’s rules. All actors involved in a transition 
should be provided with a minimum of guarantee in return for their alliance. During this 
time of transition, political elites should determine the rules of the game, the decisions 
that should be reached through consensus, and the decisions that should be left to 
competition. Among the issues that the political elites faced early in the transition in 
Egypt was the timing and the sequence of the elections and the crafting of the 
constitution. The Egyptian political actors did not have a say on this matter, because the 
military seized control of the transition process and made all the rules. The Arab Spring 
experience suggests that Islamists are the favorite during transition to dominate elections. 
When this occurs, Islamists should cooperate with secularists and avoid rushed elections, 
providing them with more time to organize and compete. Meanwhile, political actors 
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should compromise on drafting a constitution that will support the emergence of 
democratic institutions and allow for a division of power and government offices that are 
a representative voice of the citizens. Doing this will allow all participants to buy into 
democracy and avoid any future spoilers during the transition. 
Despite the fact that the Middle East countries lack successful democratic 
experience in the region to emulate, they can overcome this obstacle though the help of 
international democratic advocates. Political actors should seek the help of international 
actors who are willing to share their expertise in democratic transitions and how to avoid 
conflicting interests. The reluctance of Middle Eastern political actors to allow 
international interference during a democratic transition may diminish their chances of 
success. In this case, the expertise of international actors should be limited to mediating 
among the political actors and should emphasize the importance of their alliance and 
cooperation to establish the transition rules and road map. The U.S. and other democratic 
countries have to be sensitive to public interpretation of forced democracy against public 
will. Democracy advocates can use economic and financial incentives to encourage a 
democratic transition. Also, they can use their military and economic leverage to 
neutralize or limit the influence of states that seek to obstruct the development of 
democracy in the region. External actors are important for promoting peaceful democratic 
change. However, without a compromise and acknowledgment of the importance of 
international community by all political actors, the international community will be 
reluctant to intervene and authoritarian politics will endure in the Middle East. 
In military-dominated states like Egypt and Algeria, it is important to diminish the 
military’s political influence in order to avoid the return of another authoritarian regime 
during the transition. The submission of the military to civilian control should be 
achieved gradually. In military-dominated states the military still plays the role of the 
guardian of the state, and its involvement in the transition phase is crucial for the stability 
of the country. Allowing the military to maintain its role as the guardian of the state 
should not undermine the transition to democracy. Political elites may need to provide 
some guarantee to the military of no prosecution for things it has done during the 
previous regime. In a country where the military has a stake in the economy, political 
 102
actors should assure that the military will maintain some of its economic interests; 
otherwise the military may fear democracy and that successful transition will lead to a 
total loss of its political and economic interests, as well as its legitimate role of protector 
of the state. This task of civilian military control can be achieved only through 
negotiation and the forming of a political pact against authoritarian actors. 
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